

Panoply Journal



Center for International Relations and International
Security

Winter 2020 | Volume 1



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Letter from the Editor

Dear Readers,

It is with great pride and enthusiasm that we present to you the first volume of the Panoply Journal.

As you may know, CIRIS is a young and rapidly growing research organization in the fields of International Relations and International Security. One of our founding missions was to bridge the gap between students and professionals, be they policy makers or decision-makers, by providing a platform for the exchange of knowledge and expertise.

This mission is at the heart of the Panoply Journal. With the help of our worldwide writers, who come from widely different backgrounds, we can now say our project is a remarkable success.

We are particularly thankful to the authors of the articles for their commitment, to the members of our organization for encouraging us to pursue our mission, and to you, avid readers of International Relations and International Security, for demonstrating interest in these fields.

Of course, this is still the beginning for CIRIS. In the future, we plan to further expand and diversify our activities on a local and global/international level. We look forward to giving you more details in time!

Best wishes for 2021 from the CIRIS team.

Samuel Lavoie

Letter from the Board

If there is a period in which International Relations is important, then it would be this past year and the years to come. With the outbreak of the coronavirus in Wuhan, China, and the spread worldwide we have been reminded how interdependent we are and the importance of our civil liberties, freedom of speech, and human rights. It has shown the world that there are numerous threats still lurking out there that need our attention. It has shown us that we are still far away from a global approach that enables equal justice under law that includes all.

The year 2020 has shown us that we need to look to the future in order to combat the problems we have faced thus far; devastating bushfires in Australia, the COVID-19 outbreak, Black Lives Matters protests, the Beirut explosion, the ongoing conflict in Syria, West Coast wildfires, China's ongoing efforts in the South China Sea, and the list goes on. The world has become so complex that the field of International Relations has proven to be of utmost importance to understand what is causing these events. And moreover important, how the global community can combat and even prevent future events.

We have started the Center for International Relations and Security as a team because we have a passion for the field of international relations. A passion that we want to share with the world, and enable those who want to engage in this study to enter the field with ease.

*True wisdom comes to each of us when we realize how little we understand about life,
ourselves, and the world around us ~ Socrates*

We wish to invite all students, professionals, and enthusiasts to join us in our effort to promote the field of international relations. Despite the challenges of 2020, we can still present you with the first volume of the Panoply Journal. Our thanks go to the writers and the editorial team and we extend the invitation for the current and future writers to share their work with us all.

Best regards,

The Board of Directors

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SPECIAL THANKS TO

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The Panoply Journal is a non-profit publication produced by the Center for International Relations and International Security (CIRIS).

The journal can be accessed at: www.ciris.info and is published under ISSN: 2766-2594

All inquiries should be sent to the general email address at info@ciris.info or via mail: Center for International Relations and International Security Inc., 16192 Coastal Highway, Lewes, DE 19958

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Terrorism & Radicalization; An Overview

Since terrorism has been a predominant news item it has been interchangeably linked with Islam in most cases. Terrorism itself and the processes involved that lead to terrorism is referred to as radicalization. These are complex and do not fit with a standard profile nor group. A large group of variables in a person's life makes it possible for any person to go through a radicalization process that can eventually lead to terrorism or violent extremism. Although terrorism has been around for some time, its increasingly predominant position in this century has been fueled by globalization and technology. The lack of a universal definition in international law makes terrorism and the process of radicalization a field that will divide the world for decades to come.

What is terrorism?

Although the word terror has been in the English language for quite some time, the first occurrence of the word terrorism was in French at the end of the 18th century. Terrorism, as the word we know today, was first coined in the period of the French revolution. In the period of 1793 until 1794, the ruling Jacobin faction executed anyone they perceived as a threat to their regime (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2017). In the setting of that and coming centuries terrorism would be defined as the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims (Oxford Dictionary, 2017).

The linguistic definition described above is clear and succinct, but it would prove to be a point of debate in the 20th and 21st centuries. Nation-states that score low on freedom and democracy tend to use the terms "civilians" and "unlawful" eclectically as seen fit for that regime at that moment. The lack of a universal definition in international law echoes through in the daily news outlets. The act of terrorism in a legal sense can be strictly described in law. E.g., the United States (US) Law defines terrorism as: "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents" (United States Code, 2017). In the case of e.g. the Boston Marathon Bombing, no terrorism charges were filed. Although it was considered an act of terror by some, it was not classified as a terrorist attack in nature, but more an act of violent extremism.

There is a specific difference between terrorism and violent extremism as was the case with the Fort Hood shooting in 2009. Just as much as there is a difference between the legal definition of terrorism and the charges after an event (Washington Week, 2014). The focus on international terrorism creates a tendency to deem the aforementioned events like terrorism,

and although there is an overlap in causes, the strict definition of terrorism is an important aspect of not only national laws but also international law. When it comes to international organizations, we see a more complex approach regarding the definition of terrorism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) uses the following definition: “The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.” (NATO, 2017).

Depending on the country or organization, the definition of terrorism may vary in terminology including certain aspects that are contextually important to that respective country or organization. This may vary from international terrorism to domestic terrorism. However, with regard to international law, it is still a work in progress as there are several concerns in defining a common definition of terrorism. This varies from how widely the offense should be defined, the relationship between terrorism and the use of force by states, and the relationship between terrorism and human rights (Shaw, 2008). Despite the political difficulties entailed there is progress being made by e.g., the United Nations (UN) in generally condemning terrorism based on common aspects in the international community (UN, 2011).

Regardless of the differences in variations in these respective definitions of terrorism per nation-state, they all share certain common denominators. The rule-of-law in most nation-states prohibits the use of unlawful violence and intimidation in its legal code. The lawful use of force is commonly used only by law enforcement officials under strict rules and regulations. Most nation-states also have an electoral system that allows their polity to pursue their political aims in a peaceful way. The extent of this of course may vary per nation-state and the amount of democracy and stability in such a nation-state.

The difference in the level of e.g., democracy, civil rights, freedom of speech, and state stability has resulted in an absence of a universal definition of terrorism. The broadened use of terrorism in certain nation-states create opportunities for political manipulations that may lead to human rights violations (UN, 2015). At this moment in time, the closest thing that can be described as a universal definition of terrorism is the one dating back to the 18th century; the unlawful use of violence against civilians by groups in pursuit of political aims.

What is radicalization?

In order to understand terrorism, one must understand the processes that lead to terrorism. This is often referred to as radicalization. Radicalization is best defined by Brian Jenkins as: “the process of adopting for oneself or inculcating in others a commitment not only to a system of beliefs, but to their imposition on the rest of society”. (Jenkins, 2009).

The fact that a large part of the radicalization process is psychologically internalized makes it hard to detect and track. The process of radicalization involves behavioral patterns that are hard to detect and are often recognized in hindsight. The possibility of recognizing signs of radicalization is also dependable on the social cohesion in a person’s habitat. If a specific person comes from a close-knit community the chances of recognizing signs of radicalization can be detected earlier than if a person is isolated in a community or society.

The extreme views or beliefs and the term extremist is often used together if not interchangeable with radicalization. However, they are not the same. An extremist is not per definition engaged in imposing their ideology on others via violence. As stated before, there are those who hold extremist views and beliefs that may eventually resort to violence, even violence that may be extreme to a point that it is regarded as an act of terror. The lack of a structured framework in international law echoes through in the study and the process of terrorism as a whole. Society is being confronted with acts of violence, terror, and terrorism, and is trying to understand the subsequent processes. This often results in using the words terrorism, terror, radical, and extremist in the same sentence. The risk with this approach is the constant attack on civil liberties to combat a social problem.

The danger herein is that by using radicalization and extremism interchangeably with regard to terrorism, the lack of an international consensus will remain. Societies and governments are being confronted this century with a complex form of terrorism and the desire to understand terrorism has led to the umbrella term of “violent extremism”. Because radicalization is a process that crosses through all demographic and social strata the usage of an umbrella term such as violent extremism covers both ideologies, religions, and their potential fallout. (European Parliament, 2015).

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, better known as START, has published preliminary findings of their Profiles of Individual

Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS). These findings validate some elements of common wisdom, but also provides new insights. Some of these preliminary findings are that:

- Individuals who spent a longer time radicalizing before engaging in illegal extremist activities were less likely to commit an act of violence.
- The participation in religious activities, as well as the consumption of radical media, were negatively correlated with the use of violence among both Far Right and Far Left extremists.

It also reaffirms that radicalization appears to be a very social phenomenon, regardless of one's ideology or psychological issues. This suggests that individuals that demonstrate risk factors are equally predisposed regardless of their background (START, 2015).

The existing research on the relationship between psychopathology and terrorism has been predominantly unanimous in its conclusion; mental illness and abnormality are not typical critical factors in terrorist's behavior (Borum, 2010). This excludes an important stereotype concerning terrorism, but still leaves a large group of people that commit acts of terror and violence such as the Fort Hood Shooting. The FBI classified this event as an act of “violent extremism” (FBI, 2011).

Countering violent extremism (CVE) could be regarded as a focus on the prevention of radicalization in which the result is terrorism.

It is important to properly classify who is a terrorist and who is a violent extremist. The terrorist has a clear and specific goal, with a specific methodology that is applied to reach that goal. Research shows the absence of stereotypes such as psychological problems. Those who commit acts of violent extremism, of which there are many, often are troubled with psychological problems. The fact that they show commonalities with terrorists, such as being belonging to a religious group doesn't warrant that they are included and treated the same. Both the respective governments and their polity should have a different approach to those who are susceptible to radicalization with tendencies to commit acts of violent extremism such as mass shootings.

Democracy and terrorism

Terrorism isn't an exclusive Islamic market, and not all terrorists are Muslim. The number of people killed in the 1970-ies and 1980-ies in Western Europe is higher than the

number killed in Western Europe since 2000 (GTDB, 2020). A military response is not the only solution for tackling threats, nor should it be excluded. People do not become terrorists overnight and the process of radicalization is a complex one as it is intrinsically linked with our civil rights, our freedom of thought, and our freedom of speech.

Globalization has brought us many advantages, but there have also been some disadvantages. The use of terrorism by various groups has stirred society and society is trying to understand what makes a terrorist. This process of radicalization in the absence of a universal definition in international law of terrorism puts society under pressure. Over the past decades, the internet has become accessible to almost anyone anywhere, and with relative ease, people can spread ideologies and find these. This allows non-state actors (but also state-actors) to spread and manipulate information. These combined factors allow relatively small parties to dominantly spread their information on social media.

Globalization hasn't brought us terrorism or violent extremism, it has merely confronted society with itself and the diversity of groups that reside inside societies all over the world. Those that feel oppressed and have different viewpoints, regardless of them being terrorists or not, now have the means to communicate with much greater ease than 40 years ago. If we want to curb radicalization, we need more grassroots initiatives. Of all the research that is out there, the common variables do show similar push and pull factors in the process of radicalization, and these factors are not new. They existed back in the 1800s in the streets of Paris and will exist long afterward. The international debate on getting a consensus with regard to terrorism is an important one, but society should also start to become more aware of radicalization. Instead of waiting for a government to undertake action, that might violate constitutional rights, communities should also undertake action.

There are many different approaches in countering radicalization, of the groups out there engaged in dealing with Islamic radicalization the following consensus shows that addressing radicalization in combined fields such as schools, mosques, efforts at home, and online yield the best result. (CSIS, 2016). Perhaps this shows the cause as well in human behavior, namely that it is a combination of factors in society today that make the process of radicalization what it is.

Terrorism and radicalization are here to stay, they are part of the human race. The way we deal with it is important and perhaps the greatest challenge is to find a proper balance in addressing the issue in contrast to the disturbance that terrorism tries to bring to society.

The fact that a lot of information about terrorism comes from hindsight also shows the need for more awareness of radicalization and grassroots initiatives as radicalization is an intrinsic process in part.

In the end radicalization and terrorism confront the polity in democratic states with a pivotal question. Do they want the government to institute different programs that may breach their civil liberties, or will the polity see it as their democratic responsibility to initiate and support democratic grass-roots initiatives?

Sergei Oudman

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Russia and Disinformation: Origins of Deception

As technology advances, providing more complex and creative opportunities for alternative media, accurate reporting has become synonymous with exercising information literacy on not only the information provided, but also the source itself. While many rely on online news feeds and alternative media outlets, when strategically placed, these platforms have been used to effectively push ideologies and agendas that are not aligned with fact-based information. Some media outlets, such as RT, provide English-language news directed to audiences in the United States, the United Kingdom, as well as RT France, RT en Español, and RT Arabic. RT has also embedded itself on most Roku tv and other smart-tv devices bought at most local electronic stores globally. What is likely not known by RT's 4 million YouTube subscribers and the RT America's 375,000 Twitter followers is that RT (aka "Russia Today") is one of Russia's state-owned social media networks based in Moscow.

In a journal entry written in the International Communication Association, the level of sophistication and meticulous application of real and fabricated information woven into RT's numerous media platforms are briefly explained.

"RT is known for being the home for controversial voices; it has hosted WikiLeaks's Julian Assange, the Holocaust denier Ryan Dawson, InfoWars's Alex Jones, the leftist George Galloway, and the Brexit leader Nigel Farage (Pomerantsev, 2015; Yablokov, 2015). At the same time, RT hosts industry heavyweights like Larry King, Chris Hedges, and Ed Schultz, whose contributions serve to boost the channel's legitimacy (Richter, 2017). With such controversial speakers and prominent news personalities, RT has had an undeniable impact on the business of journalism and the profile of state-backed news outlets. Yet, we still know very little about how this organization works." (Elsawah, M., & Howard, P. N., 2020).

While the Obama Administration has openly dismissed Russia as "no more than a "regional power" whose actions in Ukraine are an expression of weakness rather than strength", on the contrary, the past decade shows Russia as a threat to U.S. national security. (Borger, J., 2014). Russia exercises both soft and hard power to extend its influence internationally, even

in the form of indirect diplomacy through third parties, likely without the third party realizing it is being used. For example, in 2019, Russia received direct international media attention when U.S. president Donald J. Trump petitioned the G7 to allow Russia to regain its diplomatic position in the organization during their summit conference in Biarritz, France. (Borger, J., 2019).

Despite the claim of a weakened and irrelevant country by the Obama Administration, Russia has proven for decades to be experts of a labyrinthian system of disinformation and calculated persuasion for decades. Prior to the dismantlement of the USSR, Operation Infektion was launched in conjunction with the discovery of AIDS in the early part of the 1980s. After extensive information provided by former spies who defected to the United States, it was revealed that the Soviet Union planted propaganda claiming the U.S. created HIV/AIDS. After well-placed U.S. investigations, the Soviet Union acknowledged the Operation to the Reagan Administration and vowed to cease such acts against the United States.

Russia's evolution of disinformation campaigns not only gained its roots from the Soviet Union, but has taken on a revised mission of a proxy war of words almost consistently through social media outlets. A 2016 article from John White with the Institute for European Studies adds to this concept.

“If Russian disinformation can convince some westerners of the truth of Russian disinformational themes, so much the better, but Russia will settle for a more modest goal. They want to undermine the credibility of the media, especially the internet, as a medium itself in western eyes. Russian blogger Anton Nosik calls this “internet pollution.” The Russian government aims for the more modest goal of making people abroad believe that the internet is simply informational chaos, utterly unreliable.” (White, J., 2016).

With a specific department in the FSB (previously the KGB) with the sole purpose to carry out such campaigns, there are likely countless ways in which Russia has used social media to push for an agenda of confusion and diversion that have yet to be discovered. In previous disinformation campaigns, Russia seems to use the psychological urge to believe in the initial information that is presented to its audience to push or indirectly present an alternative agenda.

Prior to the widespread discovery of the use of disinformation, some target audiences were absentmindedly prepared to believe the first piece of information given to them in the media. Countries densely populated and developing countries provide easier delivery of this type of budding confusion from countries like Russia and China to “throw the stone and hide their hands”. With the opportunity to deposit stories into the media while websites that are in support of the agenda assist to bring added attention, it has become more difficult to decipher what is fact among the information and what is not.

Sarah Oates, in a journal article published by the University of Maryland, College Park, stated that Russia’s propaganda, “is useful for denying specific facts – such as refusing to admit that a Russian missile shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 or that the seizure of the Crimean Peninsula was illegal -- but even more useful for undermining the institution of the media in general.” (2018).

In recent times, Russia has used disinformation tactics to execute the concept of the term itself – to spread false information, likely mixed with factual elements to improve the delivery of deception among a population. As the use and accessibility has grown popular in demand by the average person, Russia quickly identified Twitter and Facebook as ideal platforms to assist in disseminating their pro-Kremlin agendas. With the onset of the spread of COVID-19 in 2020, Russia has been identified by the European Union as planting disinformation about the virus since January 2020. In an article published on *The Guardian’s* website, a classified European Union report was leaked, pointing out pro-Russian media as the driving force to exacerbate the health crisis prior to it becoming a pandemic.

“The European commission’s chief spokesperson on foreign and security policy, Peter Stano, said there had been an increase in “disinformation, misleading information, outright lies and wrong things” since the start of the outbreak.

The commission had noticed, he said, an increase in disinformation from Russia, providers based in the country and those with links to pro-Kremlin sources.” (Rankin, J., 2020).

In the wake of 2020’s COVID-19 pandemic, Russia was revealed as the culprit, accusing the United States to be the source of the global spread of COVID-19. Some have taken it upon themselves to organize media outlets that specifically point out the disinformation from countries like China, Iran, and Russia.

On the *Washington Examiner* website, Tom Rogan wrote on social media, “Here, the Russians can hope their scaremongering lies will earn attention from a wide array of individuals, including individuals otherwise largely disinterested in news reporting.” (2020). Other media outlets such as Yahoo! News, The Daily Beast, BBC, The New York Times, and Fox News have reported how Russia has used the economic crippling COVID-19 pandemic to blame the United States and other countries for its conception and spread to kill populations worldwide. With the sharing of a border with 14 other countries that have been hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia has maintained reporting rather low numbers of coronavirus cases, compared to its neighboring countries. While its surrounding countries report spikes in death and positive cases throughout 2020, Russia has yet to provide substantial information on their fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

Dominique Batiste

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Covid-19 Crisis, the New Battleground for the Geopolitics of China and Russia

The present health crisis is showing the vulnerability of a system that has in China the main world manufacturer. At the same time, it is showing how China and Russia are repositioning on the geopolitical chessboard in the aftermath of the crisis. The strength of their positions will mostly depend on the resilience of the economic and socio-political systems of the most affected countries.

The Covid-19 crisis has the potential to reshape the geopolitical system in the short and mid-term. All main world economies are struggling. The democratic system of the Western bloc is being hardly hit by the inability to find a solution and give answers to their citizens quick enough to reset life back to normal.

While the present US administration is constantly under scrutiny for the delay of drastic decisions to control the spreading of the disease, the European diplomatic order is hit by a new wave of nationalist and populist requests that are highlighting the interests of individual countries at the damage of the European Union's dream.

This health crisis has led to a harsh debate within the EU on how to deal with the costs and consequences of this crisis. Its member states are disputing vehemently on the financial packages and systems to put in place to counter the effects of this pandemic. At the same time though, China and Russia have taken advantage of this controversy to step deeper into European affairs by sending medical supplies and personnel to assist Italy (as the hardest hit so far within the Union) and its authorities in their efforts to counter the spreading of the virus.

China's and Russia's help have been defined and portrayed in their home countries as humanitarian missions. However, the motives of these missions are being questioned as the guiding principles are less humanitarian and more strategic.

Throughout the centuries, both countries have based their strength through the geopolitics of fear, marked by a hard and deep control of their territory and strategic lines of defense, while at the same time showing an invasive control of their respective external areas of influence.

The crisis has made Italy particularly vulnerable. Because of its strategic position in the Mediterranean Sea, the Peninsula has always been a territory of conquest for foreign powers. During WWII, Sir Winston Churchill defined it as the soft underbelly through which to defeat the Nazis. During the Cold War, Italy has been a territory of spies and intrigues for all major powers involved. Today, although through different shapes and forms, the situation has not changed. Therefore, both China and Russia have their own strategic reasons to rush to the help of Italy. Important for them, controversial and dangerous for Italy itself, the EU, and the US.

China has the need to clear its reputation of being the country that has spread the virus. What better opportunity than rushing to the dying bed of the first G7 country that joined China in its Belt and Road Initiative in March 2019? The special relationship that the leaders of the 5 Star Movement –one of the main parties in the current Italian Parliament and also the main party in the government coalition– have with Chinese authorities has often been pointed out negatively, both in Italy and abroad. The decision of the Italian government to join China's project has been harshly criticized within EU and NATO environments. This is an opportunity for China to strengthen this relationship by: 1) pointing out the perceived lack of help and support Italy is receiving from Western countries; and 2) selling medical equipment to Italy through a preferential lane. It is important to remark that China is not giving medical equipment for free.

The closed and repressive system managed by Chinese governments have often been the target of Western criticism. In the months prior to this health crisis, the way protests in Hong Kong and in the Xinjiang region have been managed have often brought Western countries to be very outspoken against China's system and lack of respect for human rights. With Europe and the US being hit by the Covid-19 crisis –more than China has been and regardless of the methods used to control it–, China is in the position of gaining strategic advantages in the post-crisis geopolitical order.

The pattern that China is following in Italy is the same path it followed in other regions of the world, such as Africa or Indo-China: politics through commerce.

Russia is in a similar position. From its perspective, it has important strategic reasons as well to step into EU territory and set new lines of influence. Through the years that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western world has publicly shown mistrust in Russia's implementation of democratic values. It has often been under the scrutiny of Western democracies and institutions. However, in the past ten years, the attitude has changed. The more

Russia played a major role in the energy sector and supplied Europe with gas, the more European countries were placed in the “without option position.” Made exceptions for some statements here and there to mark some sort of distance and criticism, they have become less outspoken and more complacent with Russia’s internal and external policies. They have turned a blind eye to human rights violations and the management of political and media dissent. The constitutional changes that allow Mr. Vladimir Putin to be in the position of president for many years to come have been taken as a regular unfolding of events.

One clear proof is the major role that Russia plays in the Syrian crisis. As the US was gradually disengaging from the Middle East, Russia turned on the political offensive and openly set a foot on a ground they were used to stepping on very cautiously before. The lack of real response to the 2014’s Russian annexation of Crimea was the icing on the cake. That move was not really opposed by any Western democracies. There were circumstantial statements, but no real steps to sanction Russia have been taken. Russia’s intelligence operations on British soil in recent years have shown Mr. Putin’s resoluteness in taking difficult decisions. His actions follow the steps of his predecessors, starting with Catherine the Great and continued through the centuries by the czars and the Soviet Union leaders that followed.

Currently, Russia is probably at its utmost geopolitical role. The health crisis that is hitting the Western world is giving an opportunity that will hardly happen again in the near future. Russia is aware of this and is using its political power and influence to strengthen old ties and create new ones.

Just like China is exploiting the special channel it has with the leaders of the Italian 5 Star Movement, Russia is exploiting the feeling of detachment from the EU that a good percentage of the Italian right-wing voters and politicians have shown in the past few years. Russia’s understanding of the political opportunities given by the crisis is proved also by military and intelligence personnel that have been sent to Italy to help control the pandemic. Since WWII, never before had Russia set its foot on Western soil. What is currently happening might mark the beginning of a new geopolitical era.

In an attempt to counter China’s and Russia’s mission on Italian soil, Mr. Donald Trump ordered the US government to help Italy with medical supplies and hospitals on April, 10th. It has also remarked the importance of the role that the US-Italy alliance has played through the decades that followed WWII. Mr. Trump’s move was not unexpected. However, the question

is whether it is still on time to regain a strategic influence. It is still too early to say as both Italy and the US are still in the full wave of the health crisis.

Through the years that followed WWII, both China, Russia, and the US have followed the same pattern: gaining strategic positions by building facts on the ground. The three countries share also the vision of geopolitical greatness they have of themselves.

However, the difference between these three superpowers is to be found in the scrutiny system present in their respective institutions. While the US is an accomplished democracy, with a political minority and media system protected in their rights, a check and balance system that limits the powers of the president, and investigating commissions to ascertain facts and events, China and Russia are way far from having transparent institutions and systems. Political minorities and media are not fully protected in their rights to dissent and question their governments' policies. A system based on check and balance and investigating commissions are not fully present in their institutions. The principle of accountability is virtually absent in their systems. These peculiarities place China's and Russia's decision-makers on a fast-track lane when strategic and resolute decisions have to be taken.

The Covid-19 health crisis has strengthened the role of the "Healthcare Silk Road." As the main manufacturer and supplier of healthcare-related items and equipment, China has a new gold mine to dig, a new oil well to extract from. It can set the timeline and price as it finds more appropriate. Italy has probably become the first importer of the products of this new version of the silk road. The US, being now the country with the highest number of deaths due to Covid-19, is finding it hard to meet its own needs at the same speed as they arise. The American healthcare system is struggling. Despite the order of Mr. Trump to convert manufacturing processes to meet the desperate need of ventilators and respirators, the US is not in the position of defining themselves self-reliant on this issue.

The Covid-19 crisis has shown the strategic role that medical supplies play nowadays. It has also shown the vulnerability of a geopolitical and economic system that has made China its main manufacturer. The US, the EU bloc, Japan, and the UK might decide to launch plans to bring back to their countries the production and manufacture of strategic supplies, including healthcare ones. However, similar plans will take years to be implemented effectively and turn these regions self-reliant.

Currently, from a political perspective, the research for a cure or the discovery of a vaccine against this type of coronavirus is the main “weapon” the affected countries have to contain China’s role in the management of the supplies needed for this type of crisis. Although several promising paths are being walked on, the road ahead might still be long. In the meantime, China’s manufacturers and political system will benefit from this crisis.

When the pandemic will be managed effectively and life and production will be back to normal again, the Chinese government will have to answer many questions on how they managed the health crisis in Wuhan and how they tried to prevent the virus from spreading globally. They will have to explain also how they collected information about the disease, what information they collected, how their reports have been written, and what information and how they have shared them. In several health- and political environments, lots of doubts are being cast on the transparency and effectiveness of the Chinese management system. One of the main charges against them could be healthcare-related criminal negligence. However, the strength of the questions will mostly depend on how the Western countries, and particularly the US and the EU bloc, will recover in all of their aspects from the pandemic. It will depend on how strong and effective the resilience of their political and socio-economic system will prove to be.

Russia, although not involved in the spreading of the virus and the exportation of the health crisis, might be questioned for its misinformation and disinformation operations during the crisis.

However, from a geopolitical perspective, these charges and questions do not really count. Through the decades, the two countries have proved to be waterproof against international criticism. They might have to pay a small price in terms of reputation and commerce, but it will hardly affect them greatly in the mid and long term.

When the Covid-19 crisis will be over, the world will most likely find itself in a new geopolitical phase, where the balance and shift of power will be on the side of China and Russia. With their new footholds around the globe.

Raffaele Petroni

The Strategic Culture of Trump's America NATO Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Approach

Abstract

Systemic imperatives are considered the major shaping factor of domestic intervening variables in neoclassical realism. The present article aims to study how the first shapes which variant of American strategic culture and its subcultures tends to manifest under certain structural conditions, having as object of research the Trump's Administration NATO policy from 2017 to 2019. It was found that systemic conditions in the strategic environment, as interpreted by Trump's foreign policy executive, favored the expression of a hardline unilateralist subculture of American strategic culture, heir of the Jacksonian tradition. However, the foreign policy executive as a whole is diverse and tends to vary between hardline unilateralists who aim to make NATO more conditional in terms of burden-sharing and conservative nationalists who reassure allies of US commitments to Europe's collective defense.

Introduction

The Trump presidency has caused a substantive impact on top decision-makers among NATO allies and researchers around the world due to its resolute position regarding burden-sharing within the alliance. There could be multiple standpoints to study and decipher Trump's position on NATO, some of which includes perspectives on the degree of personal adherence to international liberalism by the president, or merely structural incentives.

The goal of the present article is to merge two approaches to study this phenomenon: neoclassical realism and strategic culture. The first approach will allow for a systematization of how the independent variable (systemic imperatives) interacts with the domestic intervening variable (strategic culture) to shape US-NATO policy under the Trump Administration.

The present article will be guided by the following research question: how can a neoclassical realist approach explain the interaction of systemic imperatives with strategic cultural aspects that shaped Trump's foreign policy executive (FPE) NATO policy from 2017 to 2019?

Point 2 of the article explains the methodological procedures to reach the goal expressed by the research question;

Point 3 provides an overview of neoclassical realism;

Point 4 introduces the concepts of strategic culture, the debates within the literature regarding such concepts, and dissects the sources of strategic culture;

Point 5 proposes an approach, based on the existing literature, to intersect neoclassical realism and strategic culture;

Point 6 provides the general guidelines of American strategic culture and its main subcultures;

Point 7 briefly studies how the American strategic subcultures penetrated the Republican Party, and how that partially explains Trump's perspectives of international affairs;

Point 8 analyzes US-NATO policy through the combination of approaches proposed by the present article;

Point 9 offers some synthetic remarks about the main results of this study and prospective fields to explore in neoclassical realism.

Methodology

The present article constitutes a qualitative research based on bibliographical review, exploring previous approaches proposed by primary authors on the subject, such as Colin Dueck and Colin Gray. Scientific articles and specialized books compose the informational input of the present research, although a governmental document is also used.

This research opts for a deductive method, starting with the general theoretical structure and narrowing it to explain a particular case. Thus, this article adopts the following steps:

1. Systematization of the theoretical and conceptual approaches;
2. Specification of how neoclassical realism and strategic culture intersect as analytical devices;
3. Describe American strategic culture and its subcultures and how they operate through decision-makers and their respective visions and analyses of America's place in the world;
4. Analyze Trump's FPE NATO policy using the approaches proposed.

Neoclassical Realism: Model and Framework

Considered one of the main founding fathers of neoclassical realism, Gideon Rose (1998) systematized this theoretical model by distinguishing theories of international politics, whose analytical purpose is to explain patterns of outcomes in the interactions among states in the international system; from theories of foreign policy, which aim to elucidate State behavior through the analysis of its foreign policy and decision-making processes. Neoclassical realism intends to bridge this divide by incorporating internal and external variables under a single framework. According to Rose, systemic pressures are paramount, thus, relative power, material capabilities, and place in the international system are the starting point for neoclassical realists. However, systemic imperatives must be translated by domestic intervening variables, and often, incomplete information emanating from the international system and ambiguous evidence make it problematic for leaders and decision-makers to interpret the distribution of capabilities and read the messages of anarchy.

Given this general picture, it is important to describe the main starting point of neoclassical realism: systemic imperatives, in accordance with the conceptual delineation of structural realism. One of the core ordering principles of the international system is anarchy

(Waltz, 1977), which is the absence of formal structures of command and subordination. According to Waltz, in an anarchical structural organization: “Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability. In the absence of agents with system-wide authority, formal relations of super- and subordination fail to develop.” (p. 88). Hence, distribution of capabilities becomes the major distinguishing factor of the units that compose the system, and since units coexist in an anarchical environment, they can use force at any time, and must be prepared to do so in order to avoid living at the mercy of their most powerful homologous. In such self-help dynamics where States seek to assure their own preservation, balances of power tend to form in two categories:

1. Internal balancing: States make internal efforts to strengthen their economic and military capabilities, and also enhance better strategies;
2. External balancing: engaging in alliances and strengthening them while weakening the opponents.

Waltz’s structural realism object of study was international outcomes, not unit attributes, and processes. Therefore, structural constraints explain why a set of patterns of reactions are expected amongst formally undifferentiated units, in this case, the States. The process of structural socialization leads States to adopt, emulate, and adapt the best practices of their peers that have proven to be successful. Waltz uses market analogies to analyze how impersonal conditions govern the behavior of units and reward successful competitors, and this process builds models and patterns of expected behaviors from the actors. Nonetheless, even if Waltz wrote that States who emulated the best practices and strategies in the process of international socialization tended to maximize their chances of survival, he did not explain what factors led States to adopt a certain strategy over another. Waltz himself recognizes this theoretical shortfall: “The clear perception of constraints provides many clues to the expected reactions of states, but by itself, the theory cannot explain those reactions. They depend not only on international constraints but also on the characteristics of states. How will a particular state react? To answer that question, we need not only a theory of the market, so to speak, but also a theory about the firms that compose it” (p. 122).

Consequently, structural constraints do not seem sufficient to explain why States choose a strategic decision that will allow it to be successful or to fail in the international arena. It is essentially this shortfall that neoclassical realists have been seeking to address by assimilating domestic intervening variables to analyze how States respond to systemic pressures.

Randall Schweller (2004), for example, sought to explain why states under balance, failing to recognize a clear and imminent threat or/and react to it, which is a behavior that contrasts neorealists predictions. Schweller outlines four domestic intervening variables that help to explain what leads States to under balance: 1. Elite consensus; 2. Regime's vulnerability; 3. Social cohesion; 4. Elite cohesion. In the same logic, Nicholas Kitchen (2010) proposes studying a State's grand strategy and the institutions and individuals who hold the driving ideas of a country's foreign policy to assess how domestic intervening variables influence decision-making in response to the systemic imperatives that shape them. Kitchen argued that one of the biggest challenges for neoclassical realism is to emphasize structural factors while allowing their mediation through domestic variables. However, it needs to be clear that, for neoclassical realists, domestic political processes are analytically subordinate to systemic factors, and the threats and opportunity they provide states with.

Seeking to address this challenge, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016) suggested that when international systemic imperatives provide a considerable level of clarity and minimize informational uncertainty about the threat or the opportunity, they limit the range of potential policy options. When there's less clarity and more uncertainty, there's a greater margin for domestic variables to intervene in the policy process.

Aiming to advance the methodological and theoretical configuration of neoclassical realism, the three mentioned authors proposed a framework of independent and intervening variables. The independent variables are the systemic factors, the starting point that shapes and conditions the domestic intervening variables. According to Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, the independent variables are:

1. System structure;
2. Structural modifiers: variables that influence elementary structural factors in the interaction among units. Military technology and geography are structural modifiers because they alter the distribution of capabilities, the degree of threat faced by a certain unit, or the effects of anarchy.
3. The relative distribution of power and polarity: conditioned by the structural modifiers, relative material capabilities and the number of great powers in the system are substantial variables for neoclassical realism.

4. Clarity: represents the degree to which threats and opportunities are evident, whether the system offers information on their time horizon and whether it is possible to elaborate and distinguish optimal policy responses.
5. Permissive or restrictive strategic environment: “the more imminent the threat or opportunity and the more dangerous the threat (or the more enticing the opportunity) the more restrictive the state’s strategic environment is” (p. 52). In reverse, the more remote and the less acute the threat or opportunity, the more restrictive a State’s strategic environment is.

On the other hand, the intervening variables are:

1. Leader images: the cognitive constraints of the foreign policy executive (FPE) charged with the conduction of foreign and defense policies. Values, beliefs, and images guide the FPE’s interaction with the world and frame its information-processing in crisis situations and their perceptions.
2. Strategic culture: norms, beliefs, assumptions, and expectations that, through socialization and institutionalization, shape the strategic understanding of leaders, elites, and society, and help define what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable strategic decisions.
3. State-society relations: the interaction and the degree of competition and collaboration between the central State institutions and societal groups. If the foreign policy executive is insulated from other political institutions, its policy-making process is less susceptible to conforming domestic demands and more likely to be in congruence with the international environment.
4. Domestic institutions: “Formal institutions, organizational routines and processes, and bureaucratic oversight, often established by constitutional provisions with clearly specified rules and regulations set the broad parameters within which domestic competition over policy occurs” (Ripsman et. Al, 2016, p. 75). Institutional architecture can enhance or constrain the FPE through the division of power, checks and balances, and public support. Furthermore, the quality of government and the ability of state institutions to extract society’s potential and turn it into national relative advantage are recognized as a substantial subset of this intervening variable.

The Concepts of Strategic Culture

One of the major aspects in the study of strategic culture is the prevalence of varied definitions, perspectives, and approaches. Therefore, there are different concepts of strategic culture.

Jack Snyder (1977) was one of the first major considerable proponents of employing strategic cultural-based analysis to address the insufficiencies of the rational actor and game theoretical models in studying Soviet strategic nuclear thought and behavior. For Snyder, Soviet decision-makers were not culture-free game-theoretical agents, because they had been socialized into a certain institutional configuration under a unique historical and cultural framework that promoted a set of regular strategic behaviors that Americans could identify. According to Snyder, strategic culture is “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation” (p. 8).

In a similar rationale, the British author Colin Gray (1981), based on the American example, defined strategic culture as: “modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from the perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization (e.g., as an American, what am I?, how should I feel, think, and behave?), and from all of the many distinctively American experiences (of geography, political philosophy, of civic culture, and ‘way of life’) that characterize an American citizen.” (p. 22).

Johnston (1995) criticized what he named the “first generation” approach to strategic culture produced by authors such as Snyder and Gray. Unlike the first generation of authors who had suggested, the behavior is not constitutive of strategic culture, and the first should be treated as a dependent variable and the latter as the independent one. Johnston defined strategic culture as a “system of symbols” (p. 46) comprised of two dimensions:

1. Basic assumptions about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses, and the efficacy of using force.
2. Operational level of strategic culture consisting of assumptions about which strategic options are the most effective for dealing with the threat environment.

The two dimensions would not always correspond, as Johnston showed in his broad study of Chinese strategic culture. Therefore, for Johnston, there was a difference between

documental strategy and operational strategy, and he accused the first generation of “determinism”, arguing that for them, strategic culture determined behavior.

Colin Gray (1999) responded to Johnston’s critique in an article he wrote for *International Security* by saying that strategic culture is an expression of ideas and behavior. For Gray, actors hold cultural ideas and behave culturally, and social actors are shaped by and actively shape those ideas. Strategic culture cannot be considered an outside force, according to Gray, the flux between ideas and behavior is continuous. Furthermore, according to Gray (1999): “Strategic culture need not dictate a particular course of action, indeed domestic and external constraints frequently will prohibit such behavior.” (p. 68). The British author observed that strategic culture will be stamped in behaviors of all kinds and can slowly change and be reinterpreted and readapted.

For the purpose of this article, we can point to Johnston's approach as restrictive, since it reduces strategic culture to declaratory and documental dimensions, and minimizes its interactions with material variables (geography, technology, historical experience and, even structural constraints) that first-generation authors consider as inputs or sources of strategic culture.

Sources of Strategic Culture

Adopting the first generation’s framework, it is necessary to clarify the factors that act as inputs to strategic culture, its sources. David Jones (1990, p. 37) systematized three set of sources of strategic culture:

1. The geography of the State, the ethnic culture of its founding people, and the latter’s subsequent history;
2. Social-economic and administrative system, and the technological base, which is significantly important for the development of critical spheres of the State, the military included;
3. Networks of military-administrative institutions and patterns of political-military cooperation.

William Kincade (1990, p. 10) argues that “A nation's strategy usually reflects its geostrategic situation, resources, history and military experience, and political beliefs.” He then suggests that these factors work as an influential force in shaping how a country perceives,

protects and promotes its interests and values abroad, shaping its strategic culture, noting that the latter is not always highly consistent or homogenous, even if, as Jones (1990) wrote, it is conditioned by permanent operating variables, being geography and geophysical constraints an example.

Similarly, Jack Snyder (1977) listed an interconnected group of elements that helped constitute strategic soviet culture and behavior and can be generalized: balance of power and strategic situation; geographical position; historical legacy; a profile of the decision-making elite; civil-military relations; institutional arrangements; economic power; and technology.

Darryl Howlett (2005, p. 4) sums up what he considers to be the main sources of strategic culture pointed by the literature: geography, climate and resources; history and experience; political structure; the nature of the organizations involved in defense; myths and symbols; key texts that inform decision-makers of the appropriate strategic action; and transnational norms, generational change, and the role of technology.

A Neoclassical Realist Approach to Strategic Culture

The intersection of neoclassical realism and strategic culture has been deliberated by the vast literature comprising the subject, and some authors suggested practical methodologies to effectively attain the integration of both objects.

John Glenn (2009) suggested attributing strategic culture an epiphenomenal aspect, allowing it to explain deviations from behaviors expected by the neorealist theory. This approach attempts to diagnose patterns of State behavior and develop generalizable knowledge by identifying causal and intervening variables. Epiphenomenal strategic culture supplements neorealism, because “ideational factors would still be regarded as epiphenomenal, whereas structural constraints should be deemed the primary cause of state behavior.” (Glenn, 2009, p. 541).

Offering a different methodology from that of Glenn, Colin Dueck (2005) applied process-tracing to analyze the strategic options chosen by US decision-makers during two continuous historical periods, 1918-1921 (post-World War I) and 1945-1948 (post-World War II, proceeded by the Cold War). According to Dueck (2005): “neoclassical realists would argue that international conditions ultimately drive the process of both strategic adjustment and cultural change. That is to say, when political-military cultures come under intense international pressure, they adjust and adapt in the end” (p. 204). Hence, strategic culture is shaped and driven

by systemic imperatives, and Dueck explained how American decision-makers opted for strategic choices that were in conformity with the classical liberal thought that the US was founded on. Liberal influence allowed for justifications of both non-entanglement after World War I and – covert and overt – interventions during the Cold War, projecting the US society model as an example. Nevertheless, systemic factors conditioned the strategic decision-making process and the cultural elements that influenced and justified policy choices.

Colin Gray (1999) argued that strategic culture often interacts with internal and external variables that shape the strategic behavior of security communities. Hence, for this article, we shall consider strategic culture not as an epiphenomenon of deviant strategic behavior expected by structural realists, but as an intervening variable that interacts with systemic factors and is shaped by them. Therefore, we shall base our approach on Dueck's findings: strategic culture is driven by systemic imperatives, but does not necessarily contradict them.

American Strategic Culture

One of the main analytic observations that can summarize American strategic culture is the absence of a single and homogenous approach. The vast literature tends to point to competing approaches and subcultures within the American strategic culture. According to Oliver Lee (2008): “the resulting geostrategic policies periodically alternate between isolationism and interventionism not because of an internal contradiction in America's strategic culture but because there are different coalitions of subcultures that alternate in their control of foreign policy” (p. 281).

Walter Mead (as cited by Sondhaus, 2006) categorized four major subcultures of American strategic culture and their respective analysis of America's place in the world and the appropriate foreign policy to achieve the corresponding goals:

The Hamiltonians a strong foreign policy must be founded on close cooperation between the Federal Government and businesses, and American interests are better served when integrated in the global system on favorable terms. One example is Franklin Roosevelt's administration, which helped orchestrate international institutions that supported the post-Cold War American-led order, such as the World Bank, the UN, and NATO.

The Jeffersonians reject foreign policy adventurism and tend to favor safeguarding domestic security. They tend to view strong standing armies and adventurist foreign policy as threats to republican liberty.

The Jacksonians do not advocate aggressive and militaristic foreign policy but favor forceful response when America is attacked. Tend to adopt a Hobbesian realist view of international relations and be skeptical towards international organizations. Favored America's intervention in World War I not out of solidarity with European allies, but because Germany attacked Americans through submarine warfare.

The Wilsonians consider it the duty and strategic interest of the United States to advance American democratic values in the interests of peace and justice worldwide, using force if necessary but prioritizing peaceful means. Strongly influenced by classical liberal assumptions about international relations.

In addition, the literature tended to describe general guidelines that comprised the "American way of war" which transcended subcultures. Theo Farrell (2005) described 3 biases that inform American strategic culture and military practices:

1. Technological fanaticism: historically, there have been varied enthusiasm for technology in the US military. In the 70s, with the introduction of electronics into weapons platforms and the rise of new battlefield systems based on network technology, all four services embraced the mentioned enthusiasm.
2. Casualty aversion: rooted in the Vietnam War, it makes political and military leaders skeptical of deploying ground troops for risky missions.
3. A pragmatic approach to international law: flexibly adjusts the interpretation of legal rules to the realities of US power.

Farrell's second bias is compatible with Thomas Mahnken's (2008) description of American strategic culture: "No nation in recent history has placed greater emphasis upon the role of technology in planning and waging war than the United States" (p. 5). Mahnken also notes how since the Civil War, the American leaders have tended to favor strategies of total victory over their adversaries and wage wars with unlimited political objectives.

Carnes Lord (1985) mentions that an important aspect of American strategic culture is the civilian control over the military. The decisive moment for the steady erosion of military control over strategic planning and decisions proceeded after World War II was McNamara's terms at the Pentagon, with the creation of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the system analysis staffed primarily by civilians that provided the Secretary a view of military requirements independent of service bias. The creation of separate defense agencies also

contributed to centralize the management of military programs and activities common to the services.

Sources of American Strategic Culture

We can trace two intertwined leading variables that framed American strategic culture and shaped its sources: geography and historical experiences.

The United States was initially populated by puritans and dissenters from the Anglican church who deconstructed their past connections to the Old World and built new social, moral, religious, and political foundations in the colonies (Lee, 2008).

George Friedman (2020) divided American geography into two lines: 1. South of Pennsylvania, where the Appalachians were two hundred miles from the Atlantic coast, and the flat abundant land made the territory propensity to large plantations; 2. North of Pennsylvania, where the distance from the mountains to the Atlantic was much less, and the soil wasn't as favorable as southwards. "There was room only for family farms, craftsmen, merchants, and bankers" (p. 38). This division, according to Friedman, is the origin of the subsequent economic and cultural divisions that would threaten the existence of the United States until 1865. For example, South of Pennsylvania, the physical geographical conditions made slavery a productive necessity, while northwards, it was uneconomic.

In the post-Civil War context, between 1890 and 1920, massive industrialization transformed the United States into a metropolitan manufacturing power in search of overseas markets (Kincade, 1990). This process underlined the disagreement between the ones who cherished the notions of the United States as a self-sufficient internally absorbed agrarian society, echoing George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, and those who believed that the protection of American economic security and values required global economic and military projection.

This geo-historical source of American strategic culture penetrated the Republican Party, and still influences Trump's position in certain matters of international affairs, including alliance burden-sharing.

The Republican Party and American Strategic Culture

In his book, called *Age of Iron*, Colin Dueck (2020) points out three categories in the Republican Party and delineates their respective analysis and visions of what the US role in the world should be:

Conservatives nationalists believe in an active US role overseas (economically, militarily, and diplomatically). In the 21st century, they favor free trade, alliances, foreign aid, and high defense spending. However, they differ from their liberal Wilsonian counterparts by placing less significance on multilateral institutions, approaching them from a pragmatic approach based on US national interests. They have been the dominant tendency within the party since World War II, being represented by leaders such as President Eisenhower and President George W. Bush.

Noninterventionists oppose American military intervention and bases abroad and tend to be skeptical toward alliances. This segment dominated the Republican Party between the 1920s and 1930s. They defend limited government at home and believe that over-militarized foreign policy is a threat to civil liberties. During the Cold War, this segment was marginalized by Republicans as anti-communist policies prevailed. This category is associated with figures such as President Hebert Hoover, Senator Robert Taft, and Senator Rand Paul.

Conservative Hawkish/Hardline Unilateralists tend to be favorable to high levels of defense spending and strong responses against terrorism. They are not pacifists, but at the same time, they are usually skeptical of nation-building efforts, democracy promotion, foreign aid programs, humanitarian interventions, and multilateral institutions that promote global governance. For this segment, the maintenance of American sovereignty is fundamental, and diplomatic engagements and appeasement with US adversaries are usually unwelcome, while their basic objective is to build and maintain strong defenses and punish any threat to American citizens. This variant can be represented by Pat Buchanan, President Donald Trump, and Senator Tom Cotton.

Applying Walter Mead's categories to Dueck's systematization would lead us to describe the conservative nationalists as Hamiltonians, noninterventionists as Jeffersonians, and hardline unilateralists as Jacksonians.

As Franz-Stefan Gady (2020) noted, during the 1952 Republican presidential primary between Senator Robert Taft and then-candidate Dwight Eisenhower, two segments of the

Republican Party clashed: noninterventionists, represented by Senator Taft, who proposed offshore balancing, and thus, avoiding ground troops commitment to Europe; and conservative nationalists, led by General Eisenhower, who wanted to continue with containment strategy and reinforce ground troops commitment to Europe collective defense and NATO.

Eisenhower's victory in the 1952 primaries can be traced as the defining moment of marginalization of the noninterventionists in the Republican Party, in benefit of containment strategy supporters and conservative nationalists.

According to John Mearsheimer (2001), there was a major systemic imperative that led US leaders to keep American ground forces in Europe instead of choosing offshore balancing: Soviet power. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union controlled the eastern two-thirds of the continent. Therefore, no local great power could check the Soviet Union without US commitment to NATO.

This provides reasonable evidence of how systemic and structural imperatives shape which variant of American strategic culture is more expressive in a certain context to influence and justify foreign policy decisions.

President Donald Trump: A Brief Analysis of a Hardline Unilateralist

As an embodiment of the Jacksonian strategic subculture, President Trump's foreign policy proposals were not driven by moral or internationalist imperatives but animated by the necessity to protect US soil and interests from direct threats. His assertive speeches stating the intention to use force to extinguish ISIS are predicated on the hardline unilateralist category of the Republican Party, a descendant of the Jacksonian tradition, whose one of the most basic aims is to confront and punish threats against American citizens (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017). His approach towards NATO can also be considered compatible with the Jacksonian tradition of the hardline unilateralists, who tend to adopt a Hobbesian perspective of international relations and frame alliances and institutions so long as they go hand in hand with national interests. Hence, "America first" is essentially a unilateralist Jacksonian narrative.

President Trump's appeal as a candidate went over with a critical percentage of small-town, non-college-educated white voters in key swing states such as Pennsylvania, and in the Midwest to Iowa and Wisconsin (Dueck, 2020, pp. 125-126). Weinschken (2018) shows that Trump's performance with white, male, and religious voters triumphed over Clinton's.

Even though domestic issues such as economics, Supreme Court appointments, individual liberties, criminal policing and party loyalties played the leading role in Trump's victory in the 2016 election, the group of voters (southern, midwestern, evangelical, agrarian, rural, and white) who chose him over Clinton tend to be associated with the non-interventionist subculture of American strategic culture (Lee, 2008), thus, skeptical of liberal internationalism and non-critical military interventions abroad.

US-NATO Policy in the Trump Administration: Systemic Factors and Strategic Cultural Aspects

US presidents have successively emphasized the need for greater burden-sharing among NATO allies. What distinguishes Donald Trump from past presidents is the willingness to take bigger risks in order to make allies increase their defense spending (Benitez, 2019). In this sense, according to Benitez, Trump's observations towards NATO has shown that conditionality is a policy parameter for the president. Donald Trump has stated that the United States might back down on its defense commitments in case allies do not meet their financial commitments.

However, the concrete NATO policy might also have been shaped by a diverse FPE that carries different views on the subject, with some officials tending to prefer conditional relations with NATO allies, and others reassuring them of the unchanging US commitments.

Table 1 - Trump's Foreign Policy Executive - Current and Former Officials: Position Towards NATO (made by the author of this article)

Trump's Foreign Policy Executive - Current and Former Officials: Position Towards NATO	
Official	Position Towards NATO
Former Defense Secretary James Mattis	Reassurance
Former National Security Adviser (NSA) McMaster	Reassurance
Former NSA John Bolton	Ambiguous
NSA Robert O'Brien	Conditional
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo	Conditional
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper	Reassurance
President Donald Trump	Conditional
Vice-President Mike Pence	Ambiguous

As the table above indicates, the Trump administration as a whole does not hold a homogenous position on NATO policy. This may contribute to non-clarity when it comes to actual decision-making. Taking that into account, it is possible to note that the harsh speech about burden-sharing has coexisted with an increase of rotational troops in Poland (BBC, 2019). Therefore, the lack of a homogeneous position has meant that the policy towards NATO does not follow a linear logic. Most of the changes regarding NATO policy under Trump's presidency have been ideational, and one of the main goals was to make security guarantees more conditional, but the alliance remains intact (Ashbee & Hurst, 2020).

To capture the underlying imperatives of the Trump administration's NATO policy under a neoclassical realist framework, it is pertinent to analyze how systemic factors interacted with strategic cultural aspects in shaping the administration's decisions.

Systemic Factors

Analyzing objective systemic factors through a neoclassical realist lens allows us to use the National Security Strategy – NSS – (2017) to examine the Trump administration's interpretation of the structural imperatives that might guide its foreign policy. Hence, this document allows the author to evaluate the general guidelines of how the mentioned administration depicts systemic inputs, and how that influences its NATO policy.

The NSS describes the strategic environment and points to emerging threats to America's power: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorist groups. The document states that these actors challenge US dominance in the post-Cold War unipolarity. The NSS emphasizes the challenges posed by China's economic and military modernization, while extensively acknowledging Russia's acquisition of military capabilities as a threat.

Thus, the recognition of the Chinese threat (which predates the Trump Administration) may have contributed to the rhetoric in regard to NATO, underlying the necessity of relocating troops to the Asian military theater (Ashbee & Hurst, 2020). Meanwhile, the continuous Russian threat can be identified as a leading factor in the boosting of troops to Poland.

Strategic Cultural Aspects

We can interpret that China's rise allowed the hardline unilateralist tradition, descendant of the Jacksonian strategic subculture, to be manifested by the US demand of greater burden-sharing in NATO, given the need to relocate troops to Asia. However, the continuity of the

Russian threat is still a strategic imperative that keeps NATO intact, and Trump's FPE varied between hardline unilateralists who want to make the security guarantees in the alliance more conditional and conservative nationalists who seek to reassure allies of the unchanging US commitment.

Conclusion

In this article, we analyzed Trump's Administration NATO policy, combining neoclassical realism and strategic culture.

The intersection of these two approaches positioned systemic imperatives as the independent variable and strategic culture as the intervening variable, and it was possible to identify that the rise of the Chinese threat seemed to justify the President's harsh rhetoric regarding NATO, given the necessity to shift troops from Europe and other theaters to Asia. Simultaneously, the continuous Russian threat seemed to be a leading strategic imperative for an increase of US troops in Poland.

The harsh speeches towards NATO also result from a hardline unilateralist branch of the Republican Party that originates from the Jacksonian subculture within American strategic culture, which has competing approaches.

The task of exploring and simplifying the fundamental intervening variables remains unfinished. Yet, studying the interaction of systemic pressures with domestic factors has helped researchers capture the complexity of international phenomena and foreign policy, and how both converge.

Besides strategic culture, electoral processes, institutional architecture, organizational processes, and leader's psychology can be explored to examine how a certain country designs a certain aspect of its foreign policy. This may contribute to the scientific refining of neoclassical realism.

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Disengagement Is Not an Option: Why Repatriation of ISIS Brides Must Contain a De-radicalization Component

Abstract

The relationship between a state and non-state actors can be a complicated one, even more so, when the non-state actor is allegedly affiliated with an unprecedented terrorist organization abroad. 2020 marks six years since the rise and fall of the Islamist group Islamic State (or *Daesh*) “Caliphate” in Iraq and Syria. A 2018 study done by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) found that 41,490 citizens from 80 countries had gone to Iraq and Syria to join the terrorist organization. Of that number, researchers found that 4,640 were women. With the fall of the Caliphate, many of those women ended up in camps and are now requesting leniency and repatriation from their home countries. This paper argues that should countries choose to repatriate their female ISIS citizens (and subsequently their children), then imbued in the repatriation process ought to be a framework for de-radicalization or attitudinal modification rather than disengagement (behavioral modification).

Keywords: De-radicalization, disengagement, attitudinal modification, behavioral modification, terrorism, Islamic State, female Jihadi, ISIS brides, repatriation strategies

With the fall of the Islamic State's (also known as ISIS or IS) self-declared caliphate in 2019, governments from around the world are confronted with a new dilemma—the ISIS returnee question. The question of what to do with their citizens who had gone abroad to join the Islamist group and live under ISIS' caliphate. The responses from policymakers in regard to next steps have been to either leave their citizens in detainment camps and prisons in Iraq and Syria, repatriate them or evade the issue. When leaders do engage in discussions and dialogue about the ISIS returnee question, it appears that the main focus is on actions surrounding what to do with the outright and obvious symbol: the male Jihadi fighter. Effectively overlooking and adding to the invisibility of the ISIS brides and their children, and, one could argue, amassing a potential security risk in the future.

The foreign ISIS bride as a subject is one shrouded in a penumbra. It is difficult for many to understand their motives or rationale for leaving nations in the West and joining ISIS. Because of this policymakers have been unclear as to how to proceed in regards to them and their reintroduction into society. It is easy to rally support for prosecution or some form of punitive repercussion to the ISIS male fighter as the world has seen their abhorrent acts proudly displayed through their propaganda. In ISIS propaganda, the tasks of the women surround the house, she is to be a pious Muslim, and a dutiful wife and mother. The brides who wish to be repatriated like UK-born Shamima Begum, and American native Hoda Muthana among others, also maintain that their role within the terror group never included violent acts, *eo ipso*, making them not a threat (Drury 2019, Francis & Longman 2019). As a Canadian ISIS bride argued, “I don't believe I did anything wrong. I didn't kill nobody. I didn't do any harm to anybody” (CTV, 2017).

These claims contrast starkly with the images of ISIS brides as part of the morality police, carrying guns to enforce the rules. Or of their complicity in the systematic and precise exploitation and genocide of the Yazidi peoples. Magboula Bajo, a Yazidi survivor paints another picture of the ISIS brides and their actions, “They are also the wives of ISIS members. They treated us worse than their husbands did to us. Those ISIS women were holding Yazidi girls for their husbands to rape them and torture them” (Longman, 2020). The case of Jennifer W in Germany also highlights the cruelty and brutality of the brides.

The role of the ISIS bride, however, has been obfuscating and it is unclear as to how to conceive and reconcile the two narratives of the ISIS bride and translate that into a coherent policy. What is clear is that strategies and policies geared towards the repatriation of ISIS brides

ought to include some element of a de-radicalization program and not one with the goal merely of dis-engagement. The point of this paper is not to argue the pros and cons of repatriation, merely, it is to illustrate the distinction between “de-radicalization” and “disengagement” and the objectives of each process, then apply them to the case of the ISIS brides particularly those from Western nations.

Foreign ISIS brides, often young women, have undergone the process of radicalization; Doosje et al (2016) and Darcy M.E. Noricks (2009) purports that the method to undo the radicalization process is not necessarily to put the radicalized individual through the process in reverse. Radicalization results in individuals becoming progressively motivated or willing to use violent measures against members of an “out-group or symbolic target” (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 79). In the case of ISIS, the out-group consists of people in the West, and non-Muslims living in the Middle East. The Yazidis a minority group have been the predominant victim of ISIS facing genocide, ethnic cleansing, and various crimes against humanity from the terrorist group whom deems the Yazidis as “infidels” and “devil worshippers” (Jalabi, 2014). The goal of using violence against members of an “outgroup” is to enact behavioral changes (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 79) and accomplish or have their political goals realized (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 79).

There are three phases to the radicalization process: Sensitivity to a radical ideology, Group Membership, and Action (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 79). In the first phase, the radical group appeals to individuals by offering them a sense of purpose, identity, and community, reinstating into the individual feelings of “belonging, respect, heroism, status, and the notion to fight for a holy cause” (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 81). In addition, the group sets out and provides clearly its values and norms (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 81). ISIS uses a strict interpretation and reading of Islamic texts to lay out norms, values, and the procedures for governance, bureaucracy, and tasks found in day-to-day life, such as how to dress. Oftentimes, those who fall under the influence of radicalization are facing personal uncertainty (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 81) or instability. Ambiguity and uncertainty in life and of the future appears to be a motivating factor, one that opens vulnerable individuals to be influenced and accept radicalized ideologies.

In the second phase—group membership—there is a reciprocation of commitment made between the individual and the group (Doosje et al., 2016). In other words, “the person feels attached or fused with the group, and the group is fused with the individual” (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 81). In this stage, the individual is seeking and motivated to demonstrate their loyalty to the group (Doosje et al., 2016), and is more open to following and practicing the group’s

norms and values (Doosje et al., 2016). An example of demonstrating loyalty can be seen on the social media accounts of ISIS brides who express a desire or readiness to leave their country to make *hijira* or “the act of leaving one’s land and family to take up jihad in the name of establishing an ‘Islamic State’” (Perešin, 2015, p. 22). In this phase, individuals are encouraged to break ties with family and friends who do not belong to the group (Doosje et al., 2016). After traveling to Turkey, Hoda Muthana, an ISIS bride from Alabama, had told her father that she had married an ISIS fighter. When questioned as to how she could get married without her father’s permission she replied in an interview with BuzzFeed Media that she did not need “the traditional permission of her father because he was against ISIS” (Counter Extremism Project). This distancing and breaking ties with family and friends serve two purposes, firstly, it isolates the person from their familial supports, and secondly, it strengthens the bond and fraternity between the individual and the group.

The third phase of radicalization is action (Doosje et al., 2016). In this phase, the individual is influenced by the radical group to employ and manifest violence on others (Doosje et al., 2016). This is done by dehumanizing and “stressing the non-human” characteristics of the “other” or out-group (Doosje et al., 2016, p. 82). At this stage, the radicalized person is prepared to not only employ violence but also willing to lose their life in action (Doosje et al., 2016). Again using Hoda Muthana as an example, when her husband was killed she expressed on social media how “jealous” and envious she was of him because he had died waging jihad and was now a martyr (Hall, 2019). Zehra Duman an ISIS bride from Australia tweeted out a picture of five women dressed in black burkas armed with weapons with the caption, “US + Australia, how does it feel that all 5 of us were born n raised in your lands, & now here thirsty for ur blood?” (Hall, 2019).

As a mechanism to prevent individuals from backing down from committing violence, radical groups often have the individuals prove that they are committed to action and the cause (Doosje et al., 2016). Usually, these are done by written or videotaped testament pledging allegiance to the cause and reaffirming their loyalty and commitment to the ideology. During the phases of radicalization, a “shield of resistance” is built up making it more difficult for anti-radical messages from those outside their group to be heard or found persuasive (Doosje et al., 2016).

Piercing that shield of resistance and working to reverse the effects of radicalization can take place in the form of deradicalization or dis-engagement. Doosje et al. (2016) describe de-

radicalization as a process in which individuals reject the ideology they once ascribed to. Omar Ashour (2008) defines de-radicalization or attitudinal modification (Horgan 2008) as a process that guides an individual to alter or reconsider his position and attitudes about violence particularly violence against civilians (Ashour 2008; Norick 2009). The goal of this method is to enact a change in belief from the radicalized individual or group.

In contrast, the goal of disengagement or behavioral modification is to prompt a transformation or alteration in actions (Norick, 2009). The distinction between the two is key; the purpose of disengagement is to stop the individual from executing or manifesting violent acts of terror against civilians. These processes do not reconcile or persuade the individual to abandon the radicalized ideology, just to not commit violence in the name of pursuing the groups' political goals and demands. De-radicalization however, works to actively change the individuals' attitudes and to persuade them to reject the radical ideology not just the use of violence.

According to Horgan (2008) from a counterterrorism point of view, behavioral modification is viewed at a higher priority than ideological modification due to the fact that disengagement can occur without having to undergo a de-radicalization process (Horgan 2008; Norvick, 2009). This may be the case when it comes to the actual ISIS fighters where their role involved them using violence. When viewing the profile and role of the ISIS bride, however, this argument does not apply. Instead, the primary method for the ISIS brides ought to be an attitudinal modification.

The actions and motivations of the foreign ISIS brides are relatively unknown and incomprehensible. According to Anita Perešin (2015) due to the diversity of the ISIS brides, it is very difficult to synthesize an accurate portrait of women most vulnerable to the radical ideology (p. 22). The data she found suggests that these women and girls are often second or third generation Muslim immigrants, and there is a considerable amount of those who have converted to Islam who have joined ISIS (Perešin, 2015). The age range of those who attempted to travel to Syria range between 16 and 24 years old, and there have been some cases of girls younger trying to migrate to ISIS' caliphate (Perešin, 2015). What is interesting about the background of ISIS brides particularly from Western countries is that they have come from "well-established, moderate and non-radicalized families" (Perešin, 2015). Some of the older brides are well-educated like Aqsa Mahmood, who was a radiologist in Britain (Perešin, 2015). More research has to be conducted to examine and explain the factors that made women and

girls with this average, ordinary profile, vulnerable to radicalization. After speaking to an ISIS bride in a Syrian camp, James Longman reflects on the puzzling nature of the ISIS brides writing, “[s]he may be an arch manipulator, or genuinely repentant. But I confess I don’t understand how someone so obviously bright could have been lured so easily to a place like Syria” (Longman, 2020).

The women in ISIS territory are not terrorists in the sense of fighters like the male jihadists. They were not there to support the state with guns or bullets against the “outgroup” or enemy, but rather, they had two purposes; the first was to give legitimacy to the group and their initiative. With the women and children there, the caliphate, according to Rukmini Callimachi in an interview with *CBC’s The Current*, “became a state rather than just a terrorist organization that was interested in killing people” (Moran, 2019). Their second purpose was propagandists and recruiters. Social media such as Facebook, Tumblr, Twitter, Instagram, and “encrypted audio-visual communications apps like Skype, Viber, Kik and Wickr” (Himel, 2016) were the main mediums through which they used to promulgate their message and bringing more people to ISIS from the West (Moran, 2019).

These online campaigns were so successful that the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) estimates that in 2014 the number of foreigners from Western Europe who went to join ISIS was almost 4,000 (Neumann, 2015). ICSR also reported that the largest numbers of European foreigners came from France (1,200), the United Kingdom (500-600), and Germany (500-600) (Neumann, 2015). In that same year, 100 Canadians, and 100 Americans had gone abroad to join ISIS (Neumann, 2015). Estimates for the worldwide total of foreigners who traveled to ISIS territory was at 20,730 people in 2014 (Neumann, 2015). As the Centre notes, this total exceeds the number of foreign fighters involved in the Afghanistan conflict making it “the largest mobilization of foreigner fighters in Muslim majority countries since 1945” (Neumann, 2015).

Shamima Begum was seen as the “poster girl” for ISIS (Drury, 2019) and as a key recruiter and propagandist. Hoda Muthana also had a social media presence promoting the group’s ideology. For one account she called herself the “Umm Jihad” or the “Mother of Jihad” (Hall, 2019). In an exposé for *Buzzfeed News*, Ellie Hall (2019) presented a catalog in which she had been saving tweets allegedly from Muthana. In these tweets Muthana writes to encourage others to join by traveling to ISIS territory or to conduct violent acts against civilians for the group:

“There are people that made it here while they were on their bail back in their hometowns. Don’t wait to come when you’re “safe”” (Hall, 2019).

“...there are soooo many Aussies and Brits here but where are the Americans, wake up u cowards” (Hall, 2019).

“If you can’t come here then terrorize the kuffar at home. Form and expand the Khilafah where you are” (Hall, 2019).

“Americans wake up ! Men and women altogether. You have much to do while you live under our greatest enemy, enough of your sleeping ! Veterans, Patriot, Memorial Day parades..go on drive by’s + spill all of their blood or rent a big truck n drive all over them. Kill them” (Hall, 2019).

“For those who plan on coming may Allah grant you makhrija, as for those who wish to remain, what’s wrong w/ u that u choose the kuffar over us. U know that one day we will storm into the west and not be responsible for those who have chosen to reside w/ the kuffar” (Hall, 2019).

Muthana’s tweets are a tiny sample and an example of the way Twitter was used to encourage and spread ISIS ideology and agenda.

While physically committing violence against the “outgroup” was not initially in the description of the ISIS bride would be playing, ISIS brides supported and participated in violence against Yazidis:

“One of the most disturbing aspects of what women did — ISIS wives — is they were involved in the Yazidi sex trafficking...These are the women from the Yazidi minority in northern Iraq, who were abducted by the Islamic state, and were forced into a system of sexual slavery” (Moran, 2019).

It needs to be stressed that just because their main purpose was to stay home did not mean that they did not actively support or engage. One example is the on-going case in Germany of Jennifer W., an ISIS bride returnee. In the summer of 2015 Jennifer W. and her husband (an ISIS fighter), bought a five-year-old girl “from a group of prisoners of war and kept her in their home as a slave” (Eddy, 2019). During her trial, German prosecutors relayed to the court that the young Yazidi girl had fallen ill and wet her mattress, the defendant’s husband responded by

chaining the young girl outside in the heat, “leaving her in great agony to die of thirst...The defendant let her husband do as he liked, and took no action to save the girl” (Eddy, 2019).

Nations that are seeking to repatriate their citizens who became ISIS brides should not rely on dis-engagement or behavioral modification tactics; they do not go far enough. A disengagement strategy may persuade the ISIS brides to cease recruiting or promulgating propaganda via social media however, it does not prevent or stop them from passing on the radical ideology to their children who may take up the cause and engage in violence. Thus, creating a new generation of fighters and ISIS loyalists and a new wave of individuals to persuade to cease their actions. The only option is to have returning ISIS brides and their children go through de-radicalization programs, because as Longman writes “any radicalization that may have been a problem when ISIS finally fell a year ago is only deeper now” (Longman 2020).

A key point in the construction of the ISIS bride is that she is a carrier and purveyor of ISIS’ radical ideology. That was one of her functions and purpose for the Islamic State: to learn ISIS’ way of thinking to pass it on not only to others outside her circle but to the next generation. As Perešin (2015) explains “women talk about joining the *state* [ISIS], not as a terrorist group, and expect to be given an important role in creating the new, ideologically pure state, where they could live ‘honorably’ under a strict interpretation of *Shariah* law” (p. 24). With the brides playing a pivotal role in ISIS—and have as a requirement to play that role—immersed themselves in the violent, militant ideology.

While there is debate about what is needed for a de-radicalization program or how to measure its success, it could be argued that there are certain elements that the West could adopt in its program. Borrowing from de-radicalization programs from the Middle East, the first thing may be to not frame the program as a de-radicalization program. In the case of the Saudi Arabian government’s program, they employ the term “rehabilitation” (Horgan, 2008). An interviewee for Horgan’s research told him that he prefers the term ‘reforming’, saying that “if there is nothing wrong with ‘radicalization’, then it is offensive and misleading to speak of “de-radicalization”” (Horgan 2008, p. 6). From the perspective of the individual who has become radicalized and joined the terrorist group, there is nothing evil or wrong with being radicalized. With that starting point claiming to help them by “de-radicalizing them” you are implying there is a problem with them and that you are superior to them. It could also work to further isolate them and make it hard to pierce the shield of resistance.

De-radicalization programs should also include a restorative and rehabilitation aspect. One that includes the participation of the family and community of the individual. The de-radicalization effort and its success can be determined by the acceptance of society and societal attitudes (Abuza 2009; Norick 2009). Many of the brides whom Longman (2020) interviewed expressed a desire to be accepted back into society and to not be treated as an outcast. The participation can help to rebuild the bonds to their community thus making them less dependent on their support network that was presented by the radical group. Perešin (2015) notes that in the cases of individual ISIS brides who migrated there is no evidence to suggest that their families supported their move or radicalization (Perešin, 2015). In some cases, family members pleaded with them to return home, and others traveled to Turkey to bring the ISIS bride back home Perešin (2015). The overall reaction from most of the families was shock and anger at the distortion of Islam (Perešin, 2015). These families are key to the de-radicalization process and with countering ideological support for terrorism (Perešin, 2015; Ranstop & Herd, 2007).

What is clear from the literature and after an examination of the role played by the ISIS bride is that should they be repatriated; the brides must be enrolled in a de-radicalization program tailored to them to undo the effects of radicalization. Ignoring this poses a security risk that could manifest more violence in the future. Disengagement strategies may work in ceasing the violence and those who commit violence. Nevertheless, this does not stop those who spread the ideology and promote violent means. ISIS brides ought to go through an ideological modification (de-radicalization) program, not only to understand that advocating for violence is harmful and abhorrent, but so that they realize the ideology they were radicalized with is dangerous and does not spread it to others. Nations in the West especially have the resources to design rehabilitation and de-radicalization to help the returnees, and more importantly, the children who were born in ISIS territory who have been exposed to ISIS ideology.

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The Impact of Climate Change on Human Security: Wars and Terrorism

Abstract

The critical security studies should be not to establish "objective truth" but to enable a broader understanding of security based on respect for specific theoretical and political starting points in its conceptualization. Issues of environmental security and environmental protection are issues of overall security because they directly cause: open conflicts, have the potential to destabilize the regime, can lead to the displacement of the population, and the disintegration of the states. Regarding the geopolitical consequences of climate change, climate change consequences, such as global warming, rising sea levels, droughts, melting glaciers, and many others, significantly impact the world geopolitics. The level of conflict between states depends on how strong the ties and common interests of the entire region, states and globally. Some states depend on what the atmosphere will be like in their environment. If they are stable and economically prosperous, so will they affect neighboring countries. When climate change has reduced living resources, the economic framework played a much more critical role than religion in joining terrorist organizations. There is a need for research initiatives on how modern technologies, on the one hand, and the involvement of the younger generations and minorities on the other, can be used and increased as ways to strengthen communities' resilience to disasters and ensure an effective, comprehensive, and sustainable approach. Quality governance and leadership in the field of climate change is crucial for environmental safety.

Keywords: critical security studies, climate change, environmental security, human security, conflicts, wars, terrorism

Introduction

While political and military issues remain critical in a broader sense, the concept of peace and security extends to economic and social threats, including poverty, communicable diseases, and environmental degradation. All of these are significant factors in undermining security. At this moment, as a precondition for peace, intellectual, emotional, and spiritual well-being, and as a resource for socio-economic development and environmental protection, ecological security appears. From an environmental perspective, environmental management integration into the more comprehensive development and humanitarian framework is no longer an option but an imperative of peace and security. In modern countries, the political, security, and other interests of citizens are modeled, transformed, gained in a content day by day, following the general changes of civilization. Today, security in environmental protection and preservation is one of the most critical security factors in the modern world.

In this type of research, a more specific branch between geography and politics is geopolitics. There are different understandings of the concept of geopolitics. R. Kjellen defined geopolitics as "the theory of the state as a geographical-spatial phenomenon" (Halden, 2007: 45). It can also be understood as "a perspective based on the analysis of security policy on the territorial dimension (the position of states) and which takes into account the influence of geographical factors" (Halden, 2007: 44). The case of climate change can also be applied to this definition to affect countries' security and position through its many factors. Spykman argued that geopolitics must deal with a dynamic rather than a static situation (Halden, 2007: 46). Climate change in every respect leads to dynamic situations such as rising sea levels, melting glaciers, migration, and the disappearance of states, and therefore, their impact from a geopolitical point of view is essential. Security threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational organized crime, with the consequences of globalization, global climate change, environmental destruction, uncontrolled and illegal migration, and instability caused by failed states, often require a rapid, coordinated, and comprehensive response. Also, the building of an international regime is accompanied by the evolution of international law. The emphasis is on the humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental dimensions of security, with the unquestionable importance of the principles of equality and the promotion of democracy. Various mechanisms are used, and the most demanding and most intensive are international interventions aimed at stopping conflicts. The complexity of their launch, the justification criteria, the principle of sovereignty, international stability - all these are questions that need to be answered before the international intervention.

The cessation of conflict is not enough to establish long-term stability unless post-conflict construction and sustainable development follow. It is evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Rwanda, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

When we talk about environmental security, the author focuses on the connection between changes in the environment, human security, violent conflicts, and the issue of terrorism itself. Discussions on environmental safety are essential for the geopolitics of climate change because climate change can lead to degradation of ecosystems and human habitats, can lead to droughts, global warming, floods, storms, can endanger agriculture, horticulture, livestock, fisheries, and even lead to violent conflicts. According to Homer-Dixon, a lead author linking environmental degradation and violent conflict, disputes over environmental degradation are likely to lead to ethnic conflicts caused by migration, to social divisions caused by environmental scarcity, and to civil conflicts caused by environmental scarcity affecting life, economic activity, elite behavior, and state responses. Homer-Dixon's research conducted by ENCOP points to the danger of major wars and other conflicts that can lead to environmental destruction and can play a crucial role in destabilized states, leading to the provision of shelter terrorists or criminal groups. It can lead to new geostrategic images in individual regions (Haldén, 2007: 48-50). In some conflict regions, there is also a connection with terrorist activities.

It is also important to note that climate change and population growth, ozone holes, and biodiversity loss fall under environmental safety (Dalby, 2007: 201). Environmental security was introduced as a term by the UN General Assembly, when, at the suggestion of Michael Gorbachev, it adopted a Resolution on International Environmental Security in 1987, as a reaction to the environmental and human tragedy and the Chernobyl disaster. Furthermore, back in the mid-1980s, the United Nations Environment Organization, UNEP, spoke of refugees due to climate change. Moreover, in 1990, the International Council on Climate Protection, ICCP, warned that migration could be the worst consequence of climate change.

Pluralism and social constructivism have opened up new perspectives in the study of security. The study of human security occupies an increasing space, and more attention is to the individual's security. The emergence of a new approach in critical security studies in the 1990s has expanded and deepened the notion of security. Security challenges are no longer considered military and non-military phenomena that existentially threaten states and other entities. Critical security studies are a clear departure from the conventional understanding of security. The

notion of human security evolved from a political and security shift in the post-Cold War period. New forms of conflict have emerged that have changed the notion of security and conventional notions of war. Human security is a broad term consisting of two categories - "freedom from scarcity" and "freedom from fear." The first term represents a broader definition and includes threats such as famine, infection, repression, and protection from a sudden disaster. The term is supported by the UNDP Development Report in 1994, by the Japanese Government and the Commission on Human Security. The second term emphasizes threats to the individual (e.g., drug trafficking, mines, ethnic conflicts, dysfunction of the state, trade-in small arms). The "freedom from fear" approach focuses on the immediate necessity and is therefore supported by the Canadian Government and the European Union (EU). As for international political relations, they are strongly influenced by climate change such as melting ice, heatstroke, floods, fires, and the like. Also, global warming today poses a threat to the stability of the international order. The author presents an example of how climate change can have on human security in the following chapters.

At the UN Conference on Climate Change in 2009, it was announced that the world's largest polluters are the United Arab Emirates, Australia, the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia. These data were derived from a study by the consulting firm Maplecroft, which covered 183 countries, and examined carbon dioxide consumption and greenhouse gas emissions from the early 1990s until 2006. In the Maplecroft mentioned above research, it was announced that the riskiest countries are Bangladesh, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Pakistan. They will be exposed to the most significant consequences of climate change such as rising sea levels, food shortages, migration, availability of natural resources, and the like. Bangladesh is considered the most at risk due to extreme poverty, dependence on agricultural resources, and low government adjustment capacity, while India is in second place, which, in addition to facing high poverty and dependence on agricultural resources, will become undesirable for future investment (Zorko, Londero, 2012: 76).

Furthermore, due to water scarcity, some of the world's most important agricultural countries will be endangered, which will lead to a reduction in production. Some of these countries are northwestern India, northeastern China, northeastern Pakistan, the Central Valley in California, and the US Midwest. Lack of food, water, and energy could lead to large-scale migration, while in underdeveloped countries, it could lead to conflicts over control of natural resources. The seriousness of the situation is also shown by the fact that the US and British Department of Defense have been considering defense strategies and overcoming the

consequences of the devastating consequences of climate change since 2010 (Popović, 2014: 58).

1. Climate change, human security, and armed conflicts

Pluralism and social constructivism have opened up new perspectives in the study of security. The study of human security occupies an increasing space and more attention to the individual's security. The emergence of a new approach in critical security studies in the 1990s has expanded and deepened the notion of security. Security challenges are no longer considered military and non-military phenomena that existentially threaten states and other entities. Critical security studies are a clear departure from the conventional understanding of security. It is based on poststructuralist and constructivist theoretical concepts. This approach raised some fundamental questions about the state as a possible source of insecurity for citizens, the state's responsibility for security, and the international community's role in internal conflicts. It redefined the state's role as a reference object of security, the nature of threats and the scope of security, and epistemological shifts are also manifested in respect for ideas, values, and social norms, thus rejecting scientific object epistemological positivism. The Copenhagen School approach is defined in the book *Security: A new framework for analysis* (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998). There are two main elements to this school: the sectoral approach to the study of security, which Buzan set out in his book *People, States, and Fear* (1991), and Waever's concept of securitization. Buzan's account of the five security sectors - political, environmental, economic, social, and military - is a well-known analytical framework, while the concept of securitization treats security as a product of the speech act. It is precisely sectoral analysis, which epistemologically does not belong to critical studies' postpositivism, which makes the Copenhagen School the main departure from critical security studies.

Furthermore, environmental destruction and lack of resources can have severe consequences for human health in societies, when communities are at risk of becoming vulnerable to external and internal threats that could lead to conflict. However, the abundance of natural resources can also lead to conflicts over resource control. With global temperature rise, precipitation changes, rising sea levels, and an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, these changes are a potential threat to peace and security. The combination of environmental degradation and climate change causes death, undermining living conditions, and insecurity.

Human security, in its broadest sense, encompasses much more than the absence of violent conflict. It includes human rights, good governance, opportunities for quality education, health care, and the creation of conditions for each individual to have the opportunity and freedom of choice in realizing their potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards poverty reduction, economic progress, and conflict prevention. The absence of any form of deprivation, the absence of Fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment, are interrelated components of both human and national security. (Brozovic, 2011)

Environmental security includes a complex of conditions, phenomena, and actions that ensure the ecological balance on Earth at the local, regional, and global levels; exclusion of any human activity that has a detrimental effect on the environment; a situation in which there is no danger of causing damage to the natural environment and the health of the population. Environmental security has no boundaries and is a global problem, task, and obligation. An example of the extent to which climate change can have on the concept of human security can be seen in the following examples.

The first example is the floods in Pakistan that have caused 25 million people to flee the area, and such a situation has created political and security problems and threats by allowing the Taliban to consolidate power in the north of the country. Another example can be seen in the 2011 Arab Spring case, caused by fires and crop destruction in Russia. The third example is the outbreak of a nationwide revolution in North Africa and the Middle East due to its disappearance. The scale of the effects of global warming is evident in the example of the significant droughts faced by Angola and Namibia in 2013 when one of the most extensive droughts in three decades caused famine in more than 1.5 million people. Climate change can also be a danger to human lives. One such example was 1952 when thousands of people lost their lives to respiratory diseases by the "London Smog." Four years later, the Clean Air Act was passed, which, for the first time, led to positive results in reducing carbon dioxide emissions. It is a frightening fact that in the last 40 years, more than 2 million people have lost their lives due to climate change, while in Asia and the Pacific alone, the figure is 77,000 a year (Zorko, Londero, 2012: 73).

At the same time, climate change is causing state fragility, poverty, social and economic disparities, and a combination of increasing the likelihood of conflict. Conflicts and forced migrations are more likely to occur in already sensitive and fragile states (McLeman, 2017:

105). In this way, the already unstable situations will worsen even more, and with the further weakening of the state, the governments will not have the resources and opportunities to resolve them.

As the urbanization and industrialization of the population that consumes too much water and uses water to irrigate the soil for food production grows, the danger of international armed conflicts over water sources grows (Dalby, 2007: 201). In this way, an attempt will be made to obtain limited water supplies for food production, which may be located in someone else's territory, leading to conflict.

A. Giddens states that although climate change could lead to international cooperation between states, there are more substantial interests that encourage division. This division can best be explained by the example of the melting of Arctic ice. When the area was exclusively covered in ice and used for scientific research, cooperation between the states was high. However, as it became increasingly possible that new oil, gas, and mineral resources could be found in the area, cooperation ceased, and there was a division of interests and tensions among the countries that had been cooperating until then. Energy shortages are another consequence of climate change that could lead to military conflicts and jeopardize security and disrupt international cooperation. Reducing emissions could lead to a struggle among states for resources, and political leaders could use climate change to gain or retain power.

Furthermore, more powerful countries could take advantage of the situation when their neighboring countries are weakened by the effects of climate change, such as water scarcity. Some states depend on what the atmosphere will be like in their environment. If they are stable and economically prosperous, so will they affect neighboring countries. If faced with problems, these difficulties could spill over into the entire environment. Some of such countries are Brazil and Mexico, South Africa and Nigeria, Egypt, Pakistan, and South Korea, while the failures of large countries like China or India would have an even more significant impact. The United States and China pose a particular threat of armed conflict. The Western Balkans are in a decades-long economic depression, with internal conflicts affecting the coherence of organized crime, revolutions, terrorism, ethnonationalism, and violence as the least desirable factor of implosion. (Hadžić, 2020) The United States is already planning to fight for energy resources but remains concerned about how vital resources will be available after the effects of climate change, while China's economy requires raw materials and has the most crucial impact in the Middle East and Africa. The U.S. Department of Defense stressed the importance of controlling

major sea routes as 75% of the world's oil and 90% of merchandise is transported by sea. As a result of such efforts, the U.S. relocated water bases to Eastern and Central Europe, Central and Southwest Asia, and Africa. In addition to a large percentage of copper, cobalt, and uranium, these areas also have more than three-quarters of the world's oil and gas reserves (Giddens, 2009: 207).

Countries where terrorism, international crime, drugs, and money laundering are present, and if these countries are also oil producers, are at high risk of violent conflict. Twenty-three countries in the world receive high revenues from oil and gas, and none of them "is a democracy is nothing but a name" (Giddens, 2009: 217).

It is also essential to note that scientists, researching 175 countries and 234 conflicts, have concluded that since 1950, El Nino has caused every fifth war globally due to fires or droughts that cause crop failure. According to a 2009 U.N. survey, 18 of the 35 wars fought after 2000 were due to natural resources (Popović, 2014: 59). If we consider that such a scale of conflict has existed before, it is questionable how many conflicts will be caused by natural resources when in the future, climate change leads to increasingly drastic consequences caused by scarcity. Future scenarios predict that depletion of natural resources could lead to significant conflicts in areas such as China caused by environmental pressures due to accelerated industrialization and urbanization that would further increase political tensions and regional disparities (Dalby, 2007: 201). Potential tensions and conflicts between states and previous ones indicate the importance of regulating natural resources protection.

In central Nigeria, this forgotten conflict, years of fighting between livestock and farmers, has killed more than 60,000 people in the last fifteen years - almost four times more than the terrorist organization Boko Haram. So climate change is a threat, and livestock farmers in Nigeria have fewer meadows to graze. We can conclude that the effects of climate change and other social, economic, and political components contribute to the spread of violent conflicts. This topic is not new, but it is becoming more and more serious. As early as 2008, psychologist H. Welzer warned in his book "Climate Wars" of the collapse of the social order due to climate change.

A 2012 U.S. Secret Service document warned that "many countries, necessary for the U.S will be challenged by water shortages or floods in the next ten years. It will increase the risk of instability and lead to regional tensions." We can conclude the recognition of climate change's security-political dimension. Moreover, the development of civil society awareness,

particularly of the younger generation and new technologies in climate change and environmental security, is not desirable in most countries. The global environmental events should have two functions: if they are massive, they will have an impact on electoral engineering, but also from the perspective of the climate background. If everyone leaves the protest conscientiously applying some principles in everyday life, it can positively impact the climate. Greta Thunberg's protest is impressive because she adheres to her principles, so for example, she travels in environmentally-friendly transportation.

However, it is difficult to draw a direct line between climate change and violent conflict. The reasons why conflicts escalate into bloodshed are too complicated. We are closer to understanding the problem if we view climate change as an "amplifier" of threats. Rob van Ritt, who explores the connection between climate and conflict in the World Future Council (WFC), argues that "Threats that already exist - lack of resources, extreme poverty, hunger, terrorism or extreme ideologies - are further exacerbated by climate change." (WFC, 2016)

Simultaneously, the effects of climate change from drought to floods are not only felt local. Moreover, extreme weather events affect the growth of food prices globally, which increases the risk of conflict. Every time the price of food on the world market increases, there are demonstrations, unrest, and then permanent social and political instability in thirty to forty countries at the same time. D. Smith cites North Africa and the Middle East: "In Syria, Egypt, and Yemen, climate change is recognized in the mosaic of causes of conflict." Thus, Syria is an ideal example of how climate change causes conflict: the world's most considerable drought in the mid-2000s. Years forced the masses of peasants to give up farming and flee to overcrowded cities. There was a shortage of water, and food became expensive. The suffering and social chaos intensified previous tensions, which later spiraled out of control and escalated into the war we see today.

Of particular concern is how nuclear-weapon states, such as Pakistan, deal with the effects of climate change. Pakistan is mainly affected by climate change. An example of this is the floods, which are becoming more dramatic from year to year. In addition to the fact that these floods endanger people's existence, they also directly impact nuclear facilities' safety. The 2014 floods caused 2,000 landslides across southeastern Europe, spreading damage to nuclear power plants. In the last two years alone, the number of disasters has increased significantly in the Western Balkans, affecting 15 times more people and causing economic losses 30 times more than in the period from 2000 to 2013. While recovery measures, primarily funded by

international donors, have managed to restore normal living conditions, the possibility of disasters remains high in the Western Balkans region.

Furthermore, we can problematize the frequency of migrations, i.e., mass escapes from changing environments. It is obvious: the economic and thus social consequences of climate change are dramatic. "On average, all regions will lose about ten percent of economic performance, tropical countries up to twenty percent - due to global warming, declining productivity in the agricultural sector, but also due to declining labor productivity - significant figures" (Kalkul, 2016).

An actual example is the already mentioned floods in Pakistan from April 2016. If entire regions become impoverished in a globalized world, this can increase migration and cause congestion within a country's borders or increase tensions internationally. We can recall the refugee debate in Germany, wherein a relatively short period, a year, two days, a million people came to the country, which brought great fragility and instability to politics. The loud public's discourse within mass psychology is often a reflection of the discourse of the power structures, and this, of course, is aided by the detection, external and internal, of enemies. (Hadžić, 2020) That is why it is challenging to predict the reaction of society to mass migrations of people.

In the mid-1980s, the United Nations Environment Organization, UNEP, spoke of refugees due to climate change. Moreover, in 1990, the International Council on Climate Protection, IPCC, warned that migration could be the worst consequence of climate change. At the same time, we often have forgotten groups, i.e., more impoverished and marginalized social groups, to which climate change has taken away the last resources to be able to emigrate somewhere at all. Within that framework, the already mentioned Mass Floods in the Western Balkans in 2014 can serve as an example. Official figures say more than 1.6 million people have been affected in Serbia and Bosnia, just a week after the floods began. The 2014 floods resulted in the loss of 79 lives, the evacuation and displacement of close to a million people, tens of thousands of houses, livestock, agricultural land, schools, hospitals, and businesses, with significant damage in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina and Serbia. At the same time, significant risk reduction requires an understanding of the vulnerabilities of communities and the economy, with a thorough understanding of which sectors and population groups are at risk. For example, farmers, migrants, and the elderly require special insurance schemes. These differences must be understood and treated appropriately in all future development plans for

the Western Balkans. Real estate is one of the consequences of climate change before we talk about "climate refugees" and others.

What can be done, especially given that - at best - decades are needed before the results start to show the climate policy results? The director of SIPRI (*Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*), D. Smith, calls for a United Nations-led institution to address security risks and pass on the findings to various U.N. organizations: the Security Council, the Coordination Organization for Humanitarian Aid, UNOCHA or the World Food Program Division. However, the author suggests that it is indisputable that the work of these organizations in the coming years will, in one way or another, be affected by the security risks that come with climate change. Moreover, technological change is undoubtedly one of the keys to ensuring that climate change can be addressed without compromising economic growth. For this to be the case, it is vitally important that climate and innovation policies provide the right incentives for developing and diffusion of „climate-friendly“ technologies. The role of government policies and regulations becomes critical since most environmental problems require collective action to effectively address the problems. Similarly, the nature and extent of innovations that lower the cost and/or improve the efficiency of environmental controls depends heavily on the actions of government agencies at all levels. In the absence of government mandates or incentives to mitigate the problem, there are few if any markets for new technologies whose sole purpose is to reduce emissions to the environment (air, water or land). (Rubin, 2011)

2. Climate change and terrorism

The closest interpretation of today's understanding of terrorism is that terrorism is violence aimed at inciting fear and crushing resistance to achieve a political goal first. However, the common characteristic of all definitions is that the basis of terrorism is terror, i.e., violence. The group of Al-Qaeda, ISIS, is mostly mentioned and appears as an example of such a terrorist group. (Hadžić, 2020) The author maintains that Climate change strengthens terrorism. The terrorist group Boko Haram has killed between 20,000 and 25,000 people in the last ten years.

Furthermore, this terrorist group has also done enormous material damage: the World Bank estimates the damage at nearly six billion dollars. Two million people had to flee their homes or were expelled. In Borno's Nigerian province, 30 percent of all private houses were destroyed, and thousands of public buildings.

However, Boko Haram is not the only problem for the security of the Sahel. The quarrels mentioned above between cattle breeders and farmers are becoming more frequent. The reason is partly that some are mostly Christians and other Muslims, and above all, they come from different tribes. Another reason is climate change, which causes water shortages, and people are left without the necessary means of subsistence. For example, about 30 million people depend on water from Lake Chad.

The link between climate change and conflict was also discussed at the Munich Security Conference. Conflicts do not have only one cause. We can say that climate change is one of the causes of violent conflicts. In some conflict regions, there is also a connection with terrorism. Recently, the Security Council took the position that "among other factors, climate change is negatively affecting the stability of West Africa and the Sahel." The region around Lake Chad is a textbook example of how climate change destroys people's essential living resources - preparing the ground for violent conflict. About 30 million people depend on water from Lake Chad, which stretches between Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. About 90 percent of the lake has dried up in the last 40 years. It is primarily caused by climate change. But not just climate change. About 90 percent of the people in the region around Lake Chad are fishermen, farmers, or pastoralists and depend on water from the lake. According to Vivekananda, climate change expert Berlin-based think tank Adelphi, climate change is not the only cause of the conflict. At the same time, the marginalization of certain groups, tribal thinking, bad policies, and lack of state services have significantly contributed to this: "When climate change has reduced living resources, the ground has been created for violence and the disintegration of the state. A group of young men appeared, who did not have the opportunity to make sure they had enough to live. When armed groups offered them a way out, they were ripe for recruitment." (Vivekananda, 2016)

A study by the NGO Mercy Corps (2016) confirms the above claims. Mercy Group spoke with 47 former Boko Haram fighters about their membership. Religion played a minor role. Economic reasons played a much more important role in joining: the desire for income, credit raising, and marriage. At the same time, if we analyze ISIL, Sputnik published data on militants' salaries during the first years of their control over Ninawa and Anbar's provinces. Local sources from Mosul then testified that the salary of foreign militants was as high as \$ 1,300. At that time, they also received a house or an apartment, a car, and fuel, which was a luxury for ordinary citizens. The terrorists were also assigned a woman. As for the wages paid to local terrorists, they were half as low, about six hundred dollars. At one time, the militants

earned a lot thanks to the fact that they controlled oil sources and exported this fuel in its raw form to neighboring countries. (RTRS, 2017)

The author argues that communities and societies that are particularly sensitive and receptive to these are already weakened by conflict and bad governments. Climate change throws such societies into political instability and food shortages and causes large migration waves. Such movements further destabilize, which can lead to violent conflicts. This unbreakable chain exists in other regions, such as Mali or Sudan. Even in seemingly stable countries, such as Jordan, the effects of prolonged drought in the van, a nation with a massive influx of refugees from Syria, could upset the balance and lead to instability. (Vivekananda, 2016)

The war in Syria and climate change are also linked. A United Nations study vividly illustrates this connection: the extreme droughts of the 2000s, the 40 percent reduction in water in the Euphrates River, poor water management in Syria, and numerous failed harvests led to a mass exodus from the countryside. Consequence: mass unemployment, social inequality, poverty, and crime. When the Arab Spring arrived in Syria in 2011, the country was in an explosive state - the brutal oppression of the opposition ultimately led to an explosion of violence. As early as 2012, a joint US secret service document predicted that "there would be water shortages or floods in many countries that are important to the United States." It could increase the risk to the stability of those countries and lead to regional tensions.

However, there is a lack of international security activities and initiatives. There is no focused, operational response in the Sahel or the Middle East to help communities adapt to climate change and avoid violent conflict risks. (Smith, 2019) Finding timely answers would help communities and groups, it would also save funds, and if terrorism on the ground were at least partially suppressed, it would be much cheaper than purely military responses.

Conclusion

The critical security studies, and the role of scientists in the field, should be not to establish "objective truth" but to enable a broader understanding of security based on respect for specific theoretical and political starting points in its conceptualization. Issues of environmental security and environmental protection are issues of overall security because they directly cause: open conflicts, have the potential to destabilize the regime, can lead to the displacement of the population, and the disintegration of the state. If climate change is not

mitigated by the end of the 21st century, it will lead to unmanageable economic, social, and political conditions, and the opportunities for stable international and domestic policies will be significantly damaged. Such drastic changes will affect security dynamics that will be difficult to sustain with the current international system. Regarding the geopolitical consequences of climate change, we have shown that the consequences of climate change, such as global warming, rising sea levels, droughts, melting glaciers, and many others, significantly impact the geopolitical picture of the world. Such changes already impact armed conflicts, the disappearance of states, and mass migration. Millions of people will be looking for new areas where more favorable conditions prevail. Such migrations will require elaborate state tactics and a peaceful solution to the flow of problems. However, if such a peaceful solution is not reached, the scale of the conflicts and catastrophes that will ensue is questionable. As global warming, excessive rainfall, and severe droughts affect agriculture, food supplies will fall, increase food prices, and increase poverty. Such a situation could potentially lead to conflicts and wars and terrorism itself. At the same time, in the future, significant struggles could be waged over drinking water supplies. Those parts of the world that are already struggling with drinking water quantities are likely to experience its complete loss in a few decades. There can also be armed conflicts in countries that seek to retain resources for which there is greater demand than supply.

The level of conflict between states depends on how strong the ties and common interests of the entire region, states and globally. Some states depend on what the atmosphere will be like in their environment. If they are stable and economically prosperous, so will they affect neighboring countries. When climate change has reduced living resources, the economic framework played a much more critical role than religion in joining terrorist organizations. Thus, in addition to a country's exposure to the effects of climate change, the ability of governments to adapt and combat the harmful effects of climate change is also essential.

What needs to be understood is that time and nature are unpredictable, and as much as people thought they were acting fast, we need to act even faster because nature can overtake us. That is why we need constant readiness to solve all the problems of climate change globally. States must unite and act together because the consequences of climate change are not the responsibility of just a few states but the whole world. There is also a need to raise awareness among citizens and civil society. Knowledge about the probability of future disasters and their possible impacts needs to be developed and shared, so it is necessary to invest in developing new technologies. Besides, risk assessments involving spatial and socio-economic analyzes to

understand hazard exposure and vulnerability should be mapped, analyzed, exploited, and shared by all. Within the discourse of human security, the population should have free access to public data in order to be able to make decisions about their risks and responsibilities based on information. There is a need for research initiatives on how modern technologies, on the one hand, and the involvement of the younger generations and minorities on the other, can be used and increased as ways to strengthen communities' resilience to disasters and ensure an effective, comprehensive, and sustainable approach. The government, or the state's leadership, are not willing to invest their time, effort, and primarily money to solve a problem that is very unlikely to reach its maximum during their term. Successful transnational cooperation is of great importance for the environmental policy of the world as a whole. Quality governance and leadership in the field of climate change is crucial for environmental safety. It is a concept that contributes to acceptable governance practices in a global security environment.

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