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Emerging Scholars Series

Vol. 7 (2026): Panoply Journal

Effective Resistance: Evaluating Vietnam’s Artificial Island Building in Response to China’s Aggressive Expansion

DOI:
https://doi.org/10.71166/c5hw6154
Submitted
18 July 2026
Published
27 August 2026

Abstract

China began building artificial islands in 2013 to project its military power, gain control of disputed territories, and further direct what occurs in the South China Sea. In comparison, Vietnam started this venture in 2015, mainly in response to China’s rapid expansion to protect its sovereignty, increase deterrence capabilities, and stabilize operational capacity within the South China Sea. After examining the motivation behind China and Vietnam’s artificial island building, their capabilities, and how they have responded to incidents, Vietnam’s artificial island building has not been a deterrent to China’s aggression. Experts have discovered that China has only continued to expand its number of artificial islands since 2015, increasing confrontations with foreign vessels and expanding its aggression. China’s newest project at Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands is a clear example of its aims to continue artificial island building and gain access to disputed territories. Vietnam’s effectiveness in deterring China’s aggression toward its own vessels and China’s continued building of artificial islands is measured by examining if there have been increased confrontations or new construction over the last five years. Artificial island building has allowed China access to vital shipping lanes, contributed to environmental damage, and increased the likelihood of aggression within the South China Sea due to a larger presence of Vietnamese and Chinese vessels.

 

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