Security Illusions: Russia in the Sahel

Russia’s Opportunistic Entry and Stranglehold in the Region

The diplomatic rift between the central Sahelian states viz: Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, and their Western allies, majorly France, the United Kingdom and the United States, created a vacuum now filled by China and Russia. While Beijing’s engagement remains largely economic, anchored on infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Moscow’s intervention is driven by security concerns and political alignment. Capitalizing on anti-French sentiment, Russia advanced its influence in the region by adopting a transactional security-for-resources model. This reorientation gained traction on the heels of the failure of France’s counterterrorism campaign, particularly Operations Serval (2013-2014) and Barkhane (2014-2022), to guarantee security in the region.

Between 2019 and 2024, terrorism-related fatalities in the region escalated tenfold, with the region accounting for 51% of global terrorism deaths. Thus, the collapse of French hegemony, driven by operational failures and accusations of neocolonial inclination, triggered widespread public disillusionment and rejection of France. This led to the expulsion of foreign troops and the diplomatic withdrawal from ECOWAS, leading to the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023. They turned to Russia to fill this void by offering military assistance without the governance conditionalities given by their erstwhile Western partners.

Russia’s presence in the region began with the deployment of the Wagner Group to Mali in late 2021 to boost the juntas’ military capabilities. Wagner’s operations in the Mopti, Ségou and Timbuktu regions of Mali have been characterized by indiscriminate arrests, torture, imprisonment and violence against civilians. The group adopts coercive statecraft which focuses on regime preservation rather than civilian security. The March 2022 Moura massacre, in which an estimated 300 civilians were killed during joint operations involving Malian forces and Wagner personnel, typifies this approach. Similar patterns of indiscriminate violence were documented in Mozambique, the Central African Republic, Sudan and Libya where hundreds of persons were killed to protect the mining of natural resources such as diamond and gold.

This engagement model reveals a strategy that prioritizes resource extraction over citizen welfare. Under Wagner, Russia secured access to gold, uranium, and other mineral assets through bilateral agreements, often finalized in parallel with or following military deployments. Following the death of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in 2023, Russia moved to collapse the structure of its private military group under the Russian Ministry of Defense by establishing the Africa Corps, indicating that the opportunistic logic of Russia’s approach to security in the region is maintained.

This strategic rebranding is more of a cosmetic change as it only consolidates operational authority under the Kremlin while solidifying Russia’s engagement in the region. With Wagner’s formal withdrawal from Mali in June 2025, 80% of its personnel have been absorbed by the Africa Corps, to ensure continuity in operation, albeit under a centralized command. The rebranding is therefore an attempt at institutionalizing the principal-agent relations between Russia and the region.

Unlike Wagner which had autonomy, the Africa Corps aims at tightening Russia’s control through multi-layered approval procedures and standardized reporting as well as minimize operational unpredictability exposed by the Prigozhin-led mutiny in June 2023. However, this approach may impede battlefield responsiveness and hinder real-time response to threats.

The Africa Corps rebranding may influence accountability. While Wagner’s designation as a private military contractor afforded Kremlin plausible deniability in the face of rights violations and extrajudicial killings, the official adoption of the Africa Corp as an instrument of security means Russia would have to bear the brunt of its excesses. However, we do not expect much of a difference in the groups’ approach to security due to their personnel. This institutionalization increases Moscow’s exposure to legal risk. It would also bring Russia’s armed conflict and human rights dynamics under scrutiny in multilateral forums, such as the United Nations General Assembly. This may prove beneficial for the region.

Moreover, integrating the Africa Corps into the MOD framework may reduce operational costs under the Russian state subsidy model. Although this may not necessarily improve transparency or mitigate the fiscal burden of depending on external military forces. In addition to undermining the country’s sovereignty and security architecture, it increases the tendency of dependence on Russia, which, at the beginning of 2025, provided Mali with military assets such as armoured vehicles, weapon systems, and tanks to combat terrorism in the region and increase its regional influence.

Compared to Wagner Group’s aggressive and high-risk assault tactics, the Africa Corps’ focuses on non-kinetic missions such as force training, logistical support, and protection of fixed assets. While this suggests Russia’s attempt at long-term state-backed stability over short-term tactical aggression, the shift has not translated into improved security.

The region is overrun by jihadist attacks attributable to groups such as the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), sponsoring an average of four attacks a month. In Burkina Faso, JNIM continues to launch large-scale offensives, leading to the deaths of soldiers. In Mali, the JNIM continues to foment trouble, including defeating the Wagner Group in the Kidal region in July 2024. In Niger, IS Sahel holds sway in the Dosso region. These attacks tend to spread to neighbouring countries such as Togo, Benin, and Nigeria. In June 2025, Niger’s army raided jihadist hideout in Tagueye killing 13 to curb illegal gold mining which has battered the economy. Without addressing the fragility that drives these conflicts, the Africa Corps risks reproducing the insecurities.

Russia’s presence in the Sahel through the Africa Corps depicts a model of limited military effectiveness and deepening political influence. External forces prioritize regime protection over counterinsurgency by promoting influence campaigns targeted at destroying Western credibility. While initial public support for Russia in Mali reached 82% as of January 2024, the enthusiasm wanes as Russian deployments fail to improve security in the region. The increasing reliance on Russian support could trap Sahelian states in external dependence without resolving the root causes of instability in the region.

However, given Russia’s increasing financial commitment to sustaining the war with Ukraine by inducing its fighters with higher salaries, generous compensation payments and other benefits, amid a soaring debt burden, the country’s ability to sustain the war and provide support to the Sahel under the aegis of the Africa Corp is not sustainable.

Given that terrorism increases military spending, which can hinder economic growth in developing nations, Russia’s strategy risks neglecting social investment and increasing socioeconomic woes in the region. As a result, the countries may turn to a resource-based compensation mechanism, potentially reviving Wagner’s model of extracting gold as payment for services. While this will further impoverish the region, it will also obscure fiscal independence. This may not be entirely different from the French model in the long run.

Russia will eventually have to replicate its approach in the Alliance of Sahel States to other countries in Africa where the Africa Corps is present, to extend it to other parts of Africa. The end game would be to secure and maintain geopolitical control.

Security Patronage as a Pathway to Economic Capture

Russia’s expanding security footprint in the Sahel is driven by economic interests, such as the control of extractive resources, such as gold and uranium, as instruments of geopolitical influence. The acceleration of Russian mining activity in Burkina Faso after the 2022 coup demonstrates how resource capture can function as a diplomatic lever. Nordgold, a Russian-owned company with a significant regional presence, is the arrowhead of this expansion. In April 2025, Burkina Faso’s transitional authorities awarded Nordgold a four-year industrial license for the Yimiougou gold project, which is projected to yield 700 kg of gold annually from a $24 million investment. This complements Nordgold’s existing Bissa and Taparko mines, bringing the total reserves under Russian control to nearly one million ounces, with Bissa alone producing 133,700 ounces in 2023.

This form of engagement, alongside military cooperation, allows Russia to bypass multilateral tender processes in trade relations. For instance, the Yimiougou license was granted amid deepening military ties, demonstrating a barter-based model where regime security is provided in exchange for access to extractive resources.

The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) which encompasses Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are conditioned to support this strategy, breaking diplomatic ties with France and other Western allies. Therefore, they have substituted Western conditional aid models for transactional arrangements with Russia.

For Russia, the security-for-resources model is not only for economic posturing; it is also a tool for geopolitical displacement. Historically, Western powers such as France and the U.S. maintained regional influence through control of gold in Burkina Faso and uranium in Niger to further their interests in Africa. By acquiring a commanding position in these same sectors, Russia undercuts that influence and reasserts itself as a geopolitical heavyweight. Moreover, the control of both resources offers preferable alternatives to SWIFT-based transactions. While gold enables movement and reserve of liquidity amid sanctions, uranium boosts Russia’s energy security.

In 2024, Rosatom, a state corporation signed an agreement with Burkina Faso and Mali to develop nuclear power in the region. Meanwhile, Yadran, a Russian company, signed an agreement with Mali to build a state-controlled gold refinery, SOROMA-SA. The deal is projected to boost the national budget by 20%. The refinery to be sited at Seneo with a 200-tonne capacity, is deemed a ‘win-win’ for Mali and Russia and a strategic step towards economic sovereignty. By holding a 38% stake in the company, Yadran, and by extension, Russia is set to benefit tacitly. With the barring of Canadian Barrick Gold’s mining activities in June 2025 over unpaid taxes and lopsided contract with the previous government, the coast is clear for Russia to dominate the sector. Russian company Roscosmos, in 2024 also signed a telecommunication and remote sensing satellite agreement with the Sahelian states to build a multi-service communications system to strengthen national security. Another Russian company, Novawind, signed an agreement with Mali in March 2024 to build a 200-megawatt solar station in Sanankoroba at the cost of 200 million euros, to boost Mali’s electricity output.

Russia’s incursion into the region rests not only on access to strategic minerals through state and private companies such as the Wagner Group, Yadram, Rosatom, Roscosmos, Novawind, and Africa Corps, but also demonstrates its strategic takeover of the region by capturing its defence, economic, telecommunications, and energy sectors. In addition to enriching the Russian elite, it risks entrenching a Russian parastatalisation of key sectors, increasing the chances of subverting sovereignty and the likelihood of exporting authoritarian tendencies such as censorship and surveillance characteristic of Russia.

Gold mining accounts for 16% of Burkina Faso’s GDP and 80% of its exports, gold export constitute 96% of Mali’s total exports, while gold production accounts for 72.7% of Niger’s total exports. Burkina Faso has increased its government’s equity stake in key gold mining projects from 10% to 15% under the mining code adopted in August 2024. This is highly strategic considering the country is the fourth-largest gold producer of Gold in Africa and relies on it for 70% of its export income. In August 2024, Mali also adopted a new mining code granting it 30% stakes in new mineral projects. For a country that produced 79.6 tons of gold in 2022, accounting for a significant portion of its fiscal resources, this move demonstrates financial tact. However, it is not clear whether this will help the country achieve resource sovereignty.

Despite Russia’s growing influence in the region, poor governance, poverty and inequality remain major concerns for the Sahelian states. In 2025 Burkina Faso and Mali rank 110 and 114 respectively out of 120 countries on the Good Government Index, measuring pillars such as leadership, robust laws and strong institutions. In 2025, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso are the 9th, 13th and 15th poorest countries in the world, respectively. This attests to Russia’s neglect of the socioeconomic development of the region in favour of resources extraction.

This may be intentional to engender systemic pauperization that ties the states to the apron strings of Russia and keeps them perpetually dependent. Perhaps, the developmental factors are not part of Russia’s vision for the region. Russia may continue to shy away from governance challenges as long as they do not pose risks to its legitimacy and interests. However, by betraying public trust, disenchantment with Russian-backed companies is only a matter of time.

If unaddressed, the convergence of political alignment and economic capture in the Alliance of Sahel States will lead to export and development dependency as the mainstay of the Sahelian state’s economy being captured by Russia. This will likely reinforce an elite patronage network due to the increasing extractive concessions.

Meanwhile, Russia’s resource-centric model in the region will lead to a recalibration of political ordering beginning with the displacement of Western hegemony, the formation of a Russian geo-economic order, and the entrenchment of a multipolar competition featuring Russia, China, and the vestiges of Western control.